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THE INTERSECTION OF CONTRACT LAW,
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, AND THE MARKET:
FAMILIES IN THE AGE OF ART
Deborah Zalesne *
INTRODUCTION
As rapidly developing reproductive technologies offer new
pathways to parenthood, marriage and parenthood have become
increasingly separated, and biology and parenthood no longer go
hand in hand. With the advent of Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogy ("ART"), providing alternative methods for people to have
children when it is otherwise impossible or infeasible for them to
do so naturally, a growing number of parents are not actually bio-
logically related to their children, and even when they are, a
growing number of parents have had their children with outside
medical assistance.1 While reproductive technologies such as in
vitro fertilization, traditional or gestational surrogacy, artificial
insemination (by donor or by husband), intrauterine insemination
("IU"), fertility medication, intracytoplasmic sperm injection,
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. LL.M., Temple Univer-
sity School of Law; J.D., University of Denver College of Law; B.A., Williams College.
A related variation of this article was presented at the 2015 AALS Annual Meeting, Sec-
tion on Contracts Panel (Mind the Gap: Contracts, Technology, and Legal Gaps). I would
like to thank the panel moderator, Nancy Kim, and the other panelists, Eric Goldman,
Woodrow Hartzog, Corynne McSherry, and Jane Winn, for their thoughtful remarks about
issues presented in the paper. I would also like to thank my fabulous research assistants
Adam Dexter, John Guyette, Catherine Austin, Jessica Woodrow-Hogan, Briana Deutsch,
Alanna Doherty, and Shaina Low for their invaluable research assistance. Small parts of
this article were adapted from my article about the broader topic of the enforceability of
family-based contracts. See Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the
Market in Shaping Family Formulations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2015).
1. Of course it has long been possible to become legal parents of non-biological chil-
dren through adoption. However, in recent years, since the advent of ART, the numbers
have grown tremendously. Twenty-eight million children in the United States are raised
in families in which their parents are not exclusively two heterosexual parents who are
biologically related to their children-they may instead have a single parent, one or both
parents may not be biologically related to them, or they may have more than two parents.
Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based
Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 91 (2004).
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pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, and cryopreservation are now
available to give biological children to those who otherwise might
be childless, this capacity has challenged our collective notions
about family and the significance of biology in assigning parental
rights. Ethical questions that arise require rethinking the tradi-
tional view of family as something organic and natural, and as a
self-contained unit.2
Technological innovation always creates new challenges for the
law. As new technologies create new possibilities, they also create
legal and ethical questions that may take years to resolve. Ethical
and legal questions persist regarding the enforceability of con-
tracts that facilitate the formation of non-traditional families.
New reproductive technologies also allow for far-reaching repro-
ductive decision-making that was not possible even a generation
ago. Parents can now select the sex, race, or other characteristics
of an embryo to be implanted. Parents can also choose to cryo-
preserve their embryos to allow for implantation in the future, or
choose to terminate or reduce a pregnancy because of birth de-
fects or multiples. With the opportunities presented by reproduc-
tive autonomy and choice comes a legal and ethical chaos of sorts,
and a division that pits consent against state and public interest.
This article contemplates the ways in which technology has af-
fected existing assumptions about ownership and relationships,
and the ways in which it has changed legal statuses and the law.
It looks specifically at the ways in which the law, technology, and
the market are intersecting with respect to reproductive technol-
ogy, creating both new paths and new roadblocks. This article ex-
amines the ethical questions that have arisen based on the capa-
bilities of new reproductive technologies, and the ethical
questions that have arisen when, through private ordering, par-
ties attempt to reduce the risk of uncertainty from new reproduc-
tive technologies.
There are many reasons that people may turn to technology for
reproductive choices, including health issues that undermine car-
rying a healthy pregnancy (like breast cancer or blood diseases);
the parents' inability to reproduce because of infertility or be-
cause they are a same-sex couple; the desire to harvest eggs or
2. See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 246 (1997); Janet L. Dolgin, The Law Debates the Fami-
ly: Reproductive Transformations, 7 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 37, 38-41 (1995).
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sperm before undergoing irreversible medical procedures that
prevent reproduction (such as full-body radiation or hysterecto-
my); or the desire to harvest one's own eggs for future family
planning after ideal reproductive age.3 Using the many existing
forms of reproductive technologies now available, there are seem-
ingly infinite family arrangement possibilities.
Through medical procedures such as pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis, it is now possible to create so-called "designer babies."4
Early prenatal visits can reveal that the mother or surrogate is
carrying a high-order, multiple pregnancy.5 High-level ultra
sounds and amniocentesis can alert parents to birth defects,6
whether or not severe enough to impair the child's quality of life.7
Such prenatal screening can lead to issues as varied as selective
abortion and eugenics.' Similarly, still relatively new reproduc-
tive capacities, such as artificial insemination, in vitro fertiliza-
tion ("IVF'), gamete donation and transfer, traditional and gesta-
tional surrogacy, and cryopreservation, can lead to issues as
varied as cloning and posthumous reproduction, and can result in
a multitude of nontraditional family formations, including multi-
ple varieties of families with more than two parents.9
3. See Bruce L. Wilder, Assisted Reproduction Technology: Trends and Suggestions
for the Developing Law, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. 177, 182 (2002); Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender
Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 311-15 (1990).
4. See Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 283, 285 (2008); SARAH FRANKLIN
& CELIA ROBERTS, BORN AND MADE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC
DIAGNOSIS 1-2 (2006).
5. See B. J. Whitlow et al., The Value of Sonography in Early Pregnancy for the De-
tection of Fetal Abnormalities in an Unselected Population, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOLOGY 929, 934 (1999).
6. See E. Albert Reece & Carol J. Homko, Embryoscopy, Fetal Therapy, and Ethical
Implications, 57 ALB. L. REV. 709, 709 (1994).
7. See H616ne Grandjean, Dani6le Larroque & Salvator Levi, The Performance of
Routine Ultrasonographic Screening of Pregnancies in the Eurofetus Study, 181 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 446, 449-50 (1999) (discussing the detection of major and mi-
nor malformations in fetuses).
8. See Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven't Changed My Mind About Prenatal Diagnosis:
Reflections and Refinements, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 234, 234 - 235
(Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) (discussing ethical issues with selective abor-
tion); Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
897, 898 (2007) (discussing moral concerns that reproductive technology has the ability to
be used in eugenic ways).
9. See Bruce A. Fowler & Teresa C. Baird, Frozen in Time: Planning for the Posthu-
mously Conceived Child, 37 COLO. LAW. 45, 45 (2008); Andre P. Rose, Note, Reproductive
Misconception: Why Cloning Is Not Just Another Assisted Reproductive Technology, 48
2017]
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As these technologies develop, questions arise as to whether, as
a society, we should allow market forces and private contracting
to control their use. Is leaving development of reproductive tech-
nology to the demands of the market equivalent to saying nothing
is right or wrong-only efficient or inefficient, wealth maximiz-
ing, or not wealth maximizing? Or does the market represent the
natural course of change and the inevitable direction of society,
with regulation of technology in these areas simply inhibiting
progress? Should ART be regulated and limited, or should it
freely flourish? There is no single answer to these questions that
can be applied across the board to all the various existing and
emerging technologies. I argue, however, that where there is ten-
sion between individual reproductive choice and other moral val-
ues, the use of reproductive technologies is most often best left to
the choice of individuals and the innovation of the market.
Part I highlights some of the ethical issues that arise from the
reproductive capabilities that have developed over the past dec-
ades, focusing specifically on: gamete donation and surrogacy, re-
sulting in more than two legal or biological parents; pre-
implantation genetic testing; the creation, selection, freezing, and
destruction of embryos; and prenatal testing, selective abortion
and selective reduction. Much of the resistance to these technolo-
gies stems from long-held and deeply ingrained beliefs about the
purity of reproduction and motherhood. ° As technology continues
to create reproductive possibilities that were once unheard of or
considered fantasy, the purity of motherhood, pregnancy, repro-
duction, and family are threatened, creating controversy and de-
bate. This part examines some potentially troubling contract
clauses that can give reproduction choices to intended parents
that did not exist before technology facilitated it. The part then
attributes some of the resulting ethical concern to societal hesi-
tance to deviate from traditional family norms, looking specifical-
ly at the sacredness of motherhood and primacy of biology in def-
initions of parenthood.
Part I also addresses the problems of exploitation and lack of
assent, problems that often account for some people's negative re-
action to the technologies discussed. A common critique of the
DUKE L.J. 1133, 1133-34 (1999); Dolgin, The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Trans-
formations, supra note 2, at 38-39.
10. See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 911, 912 (1996).
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technologies discussed is the potential for exploitation of women."
There is an important argument that women have not truly con-
sented if they choose to sell their genetic material or use their
bodies to carry a child for others, or if they agree to contract
clauses affecting reproduction, such as a hopeful mother's agree-
ment to dispose of unused embryos during IVF, or a surrogate's
agreement to selectively reduce a pregnancy if the intended par-
ent asks. The consent in those cases is thought to be involuntary,
or at least weakened by the need for financial compensation. 2
This part outlines seven reasons that exploitation is not the par-
amount concern. Importantly, studies show that most women
making such choices do so with extended thought and care and
with full knowledge, and their decision making is already con-
trolled by careful screening and restrictions. Further limiting a
woman's contractual freedom in these areas would wrongly pre-
sume that all women experience pregnancy and child-birth the
same way, severely undermining a woman's autonomy."
Finally, this part addresses the legitimate concern of the high
cost of these technologies, potentially prohibiting equal access to
these services." For example, one of the greatest access concerns
is with the use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis ("PGD") and
the process of genetic enhancement. PGD has the potential to
create physically and intellectually superior children for those
who can afford the technology, arguably widening the gap be-
tween the haves and the have-nots." This part ultimately con-
cludes, however, that the paramount importance of reproductive
11. See Martha A. Field, Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1155, 1155-56
(2014); June Mary Zekan Makdisi, Involuntary Cloning: A Battery, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
13, 17 (2005); Joan Mahoney, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, 16 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 81, 81 (1988).
12. See Field, supra note 11, at 1155.
13. To be sure, the burdens and risks associated with ART are not equally shared be-
tween men and women, with women often bearing the major physical and psychological
burden. Because a woman's status in many societies is identified with her fertility, the
social burden of infertility can also be much heavier on women. Therefore, in general, the
ethical issues with ART may affect women disproportionately. Because of this, and be-
cause historically women's autonomy has been challenged far more than men's, the focus
of this part is on protecting the individual autonomy and decisionmaking of women re-
garding reproduction (though my thesis supports the protection of men's reproductive au-
tonomy as well). See Mahoney, supra note 11, at 82-83.
14. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUmAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 227 (1995).
15. See Laura Damiano, When Parents Can Choose to Have the "Perfect" Child: Why
Fertility Clinics Should Be Required to Report Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Data, 49
FAM. CT. REV. 846, 851-53 (2011).
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freedom should outweigh potential concerns about access, espe-
cially in light of the fact that competition and insurance should
eventually drive the price down.
Despite these valid critiques, in Part II, this article argues for
emphasis on consent and market freedom, and for more rigorous
and consistent enforcement of reproductive agreements. Failure
to enforce the intentions of the parties when it comes to reproduc-
tive contracts involving children has often led to unintended and
sometimes absurd results, results often not in the best interests
of the child, such as the unintended separation of twins, an in-
tended couple paying the expenses for a baby when they do not
get custody, or a sperm donor being required to pay child support.
More broadly speaking, failure to enforce reproductive contracts
can inhibit the development of important technologies and can
thwart medical advances.
The law, which by its nature is slow to respond to and slow to
capture a constantly evolving societal mood, is ill-equipped to
regulate reproduction. 6 For example, over a century ago, artificial
insemination was thought to be scandalous, but eventually, opin-
ions softened and the practice is now commonplace. 7 Since law
necessarily lags behind social momentum, family law and regula-
tion are often unable to address adequately the myriad ethical is-
sues that have arisen, and are likely to arise, as technology ad-
vances further. The lag of family law behind technology can be
explained both by state legislatures remaining slow to expand
statutory definitions of family, and by family law remaining doc-
trinally wedded to its patriarchal origins. But even as family law
adapts, it will never be able to keep pace with the rapid develop-
ments happening in reproductive technology and accommodate
all possible non-normative relationships, expanding based on cul-
tural and social shifts, and made even more accessible through
technology. Legislation often fails to address individual issues
that fall outside the norm, it can be over-inclusive, and it can hold
back progress.
16. Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change:
The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 515-17 (2005); Wel-
don E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the Science of Artifi-
cial Reproductive Technology and the Laws Which Govern that Technology, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 825, 825 (1999); James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues
Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 814 (1998).
17. See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look
at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1035-37 (2002).
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On the other hand, consent, market forces, and contract law,
based on individual needs, individual desires, and societal de-
mand, are in the best position for dealing with rapid technological
momentum.18 People have a fundamental right, both morally and
legally, to privacy and freedom regarding reproduction, so inter-
vention where there are private reproductive agreements is not
usually justified without identifiable harm to identifiable individ-
uals. Despite ongoing resistance by a sizeable segment of the
population to reproductive freedom (evident by the development
of the law regarding contraception and abortion), individual
choice today generally guides reproduction (whether natural or
artificially mediated). It follows that a free market and private
contracting are the best vehicles for delivering assisted reproduc-
tive services and for responding to individual choice.
Commerce in human gametes has seen huge and increasing
demand in recent decades. This article argues that such com-
merce need not be any different from commerce in other meaning-
ful activities of life (such as paying one's doctor) or commerce in
other articles of special significance (such as a religious text or a
wedding ring). Facilitating the use of ART, including the ability
to buy and sell gametes and the ability to do prenatal screening
and make individual choices about pregnancy, is generally best
for society. When market demand is high, it spurs innovation and
medical advances (including the ability to diagnose genetic disor-
ders prior to embryo transfer), while also helping otherwise infer-
tile couples to participate in procreation and raise healthy chil-
dren.
Choice must, of course, be real. Those who seek reproductive
services must be adequately informed of their options and the
risks and benefits. However, as long as the natural restrictive pa-
rameters of informed consent in contract law are policed, private
agreements and choice should govern. While contract law, con-
sent, and the market cannot necessarily deal adequately with
every contingency, they are generally better suited than family
law and state regulation to deal with the vast ethical quandaries
that arise from sweeping change. Assisted reproduction, like sex-
ual reproduction, is not a social enterprise. Although it often in-
18. See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Con-
tract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 817-18 (1985) ("The private
contract establishes a first-order relationship based on individual needs and desires.").
2017]
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volves more than two parties, it is still based on private arrange-
ments and should be governed by rules of privacy and autonomy.
1. ETHICAL ISSUES CREATED BY NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILY FORMATIONS AND
CULTURAL FEARS
New and emerging advances in prenatal testing and screening,
and new medical procedures developed to improve an infertile
couple's chance of a healthy pregnancy have led to pressing ethi-
cal questions about autonomy, individual choice, and the nature
of family. The following sections highlight the effects of ART on
social conceptions of motherhood and family in different contexts
and advance the notion that reproductive autonomy should be
paramount, considered above most other ethical concerns.
With progress, often comes fear of the dark side of technologi-
cal advancement-fear of the unknown or fear of deviation from
tradition. Since new technologies can reshape society (in this
case, by redefining reproductive and family possibilities), public
concerns tend to have a strong moral or ethical element, in addi-
tion to more traditional concerns about health and safety. 9 Such
ethical, social, and sometimes religious concerns are generally
rooted in traditional values and, in the case of ART, moral beliefs
about the purity and sacredness of reproduction, motherhood, and
family.2 ' Although ART was developed to help an infertile couple's
chances of getting pregnant, today it is also used by fertile people,
including male or female homosexual couples, single men and
women, and post-menopausal women-a break from the tradi-
tional dyad of marriage and parenthood.2 ' Deeply held beliefs that
marriage should be between a man and a woman, only married
couples should have children, and reproduction and motherhood
should be natural, as well as concerns about the fragmented fami-
lies may that can be created when it is not, have sparked much of
19. Gregory A. Triber, Growing Pains: Disputes Surrounding Human Reproductive
Interests Stretch the Boundaries of Traditional Legal Concepts, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
103, 103-04 (1988) (explaining that new reproductive technologies have caused social and
ethical concerns).
20. See id. at 105-06, 111 (explaining that human reproduction has a special and sa-
cred meaning for people and that religious groups question whether ART should be al-
lowed to exist at all).
21. Reproductive Technology, ADELAIDE CENTRE FOR BIOETHICS AND CULTURE http://
www.bioethics.org.au/Resources/Resource%/20Topics/Reproductive%/ 20Technology.html.
(last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
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the debate about the appropriate use of technology involving re-
production.22
Beliefs about the purity of reproduction and motherhood play
out in specific ways as they relate to different technologies, but
the core values are often the same. One hundred years ago there
was nothing to challenge natural motherhood.23 But today, assist-
ed reproductive technologies challenge a central cultural assump-
tion: reproduction and motherhood are and should be natural, ex-
alted above all else." Historically, it was thought that people
should have children out of love and altruism, and should not be
paid for their genetic material or for carrying a child. Potential
parents should accept the gift of a child, regardless of gender and
despite health conditions. Additionally, a mother is expected to
have a special bond with the child she is carrying that should
transcend a private contract or any other interests. The potential
created by technology requires examination of the assumption
that parenthood should involve procreation by a genetic male and
a genetic female and should be the natural result of love.
This part focuses on the tension between individual choice and
other moral values, specifically focusing on surrogacy and gamete
donation, pre-implantation genetic testing, the use of excess em-
bryos, and selective abortion or reduction. For each type of tech-
nology or reproductive choice, critics generally fear the commodi-
fication of family and reproduction, exploitation and lack of
consent, and unequal access.25 This part shows that these con-
cerns are overstated, often rooted in traditional and untested be-
liefs about the sacredness of motherhood and family, and should
give way to the paramount concern of reproductive autonomy.
22. See Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parent-
age for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 353, 373-74, 376 (2011).
23. See Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Timeline, ART: TALKING TO
CHILDREN ABOUT ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, www.artparenting.org/about
(last visited Dec. 16, 2016) (indicating that the first successful in vitro fertilization did not
occur until 1978).
24. See Dana, supra note 22, at 376.
25. See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Welcome to the Wild West: Protecting Access to Cross
Border Fertility Care in the United States, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 351 (2012)
(outlining the debates related to ART).
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A. Surrogacy and Gamete Donation
Surrogacy is becoming more widely accepted in the United
States every year.2" Liberalization of surrogacy and a wider ac-
ceptance of the practice are linked to the expansion of rights for
gay couples-the human rights issues that propelled legalization
of gay marriage also drove reform in the area of surrogacy.27 Sur-
rogacy perpetuates the traditional idea that women should be-
come mothers, opening doors for thousands of women and men to
have a biological connection to their children.
While the practices of surrogacy and gamete donation are gen-
erally accepted today, they can lead to nontraditional family for-
mulations that push the boundaries of "family."2 Consider the
story of Jodie and Shannon, two sisters who helped birth each
other's children.29 When Jodie and her husband were unable to
conceive, they used Shannon's egg for IVF.3 Then, later, when
Shannon was unable to carry a child herself, they used Jodie as a
surrogate for Shannon and her husband's twins.2 ' Shannon be-
came the biological parent of her sister's child, and Jodie became
the aunt of the child she gave birth to.2 Scenarios like this chal-
lenge societal notions of parenthood as something natural.
Relatedly, these reproductive technologies share common ethi-
cal issues revolving around contracting and compensation. Sever-
al countries prohibit financial compensation for the donors and
for the surrogate.3 The arguments against compensation include
arguments that the technology disturbs traditional notions of
family, and that the commodification, or "buying and selling," of
26. See Dana, supra note 22, at 362 (explaining that with the development of in vitro
fertilization came a rise in the social acceptance of surrogacy beginning in the 1980s).
27. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1191, 1253 (2016).
28. See Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-
Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 431, 434, 436-37
(1999).
29. Wes Judd, The Messy, Complicated Nature of Assisted Reproductive Technology,
PAC. STANDARD (Sept. 28, 2015), https://psmag.com/the-messy-complicated-nature-of-assis
ted-reproductive-technology-349d0c55a874#.3gmvegbm6.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See generally Kiran Sreenivas & Lisa Campo- Engelstein, Domestic and Interna-
tional Surrogacy Laws: Implications for Cancer Survivors, 156 CANCER TREATMENT RES.
135 (2010).
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human gametes and reproduction generally is inherently immoral
and may lead to the exploitation of women.3 Also, since infertility
treatment is expensive and insurance coverage is rare, these
technologies are generally only available to those who can afford
it,3 creating inequality of access. With the market maintaining
an elevated price, fertility continues to be seen as an asset or
commodity, perpetuating its commodification."
Despite these concerns, views on surrogacy radically changed
in this country, and continue to quickly evolve in favor of gesta-
tional surrogacy agreements since modern-day surrogacy first
came on the scene in the 1970s. New York, for example, is on the
verge of radically changing the way it regulates surrogacy. Surro-
gacy became illegal in New York in 1992, shortly after the contro-
versial New Jersey Baby M case.37 However, the Child-Parent Se-
curity Act,3" recently considered by the Legislature, would make
surrogacy agreements enforceable.39 Currently only the District of
Columbia and four states (including New York) ban surrogacy
outright." While twenty-one states are silent on the issue, seven
states allow surrogacy through case law, and twenty-two states
have statutes that allow surrogacy with regulation.4
Since the early days of surrogacy and Baby M, changes in tech-
nology and traditional notions of family have weakened the ra-
tionale behind banning surrogacy. As reproductive technology has
improved, "gestational" surrogacy-where the surrogate has no
biological relationship to the child--"has overtaken 'traditional'
34. See Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Commodification and Commercialization of Human
Embryo Research, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 39, 41-43 (1995) (explaining that commodifica-
tion of human gametes creates important ethical questions and poses a harm of exploita-
tion to women).
35. See Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16
MICH. J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 217, 280. The average cost per VF cycle is $9,266. Paul R.
Brezina & Yulian Zhao, The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Impacted by Modern Assist-
ed Reproductive Technologies, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY INT'L (2012), https://www.hind
awi.com/journals/ogi/2012/686253/.
36. See Suter, supra note 35, at 294-95.
37. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
38. S.2765, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); A.4319, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2015).
39. Pamela Miller & Valerie Cohen, Changing Tides: Legalizing Surrogacy in New
York, N.Y.L.J. (Mar 18, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202752468097/
Changing-Tides-Legalizing-Surrogacy-in-New-York.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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surrogacy."42 Many believe that the public policy against "selling"
parental rights is less forceful when applied to gestational surro-
gacy, since the surrogate is not the natural mother of the child.43
In one case, for example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania up-
held a gestational surrogacy agreement, characterizing the policy
argument against surrogacy as "unsustainable in the face of the
evolving role played by alternative reproductive technologies in
contemporary American society."4 The court highlighted a "grow-
ing acceptance of alternative reproductive technologies" in the
Commonwealth." The evolution of state surrogacy laws can be at-
tributed, at least in part, to a growing acceptance of same-sex
partnerships, and the concomitant growing use of assisted repro-
duction by same-sex couples. The American Society for Reproduc-
tive Medicine describes a "notable trend ... for lesbian women
and couples and, increasingly, for single and coupled gay men, to
have offspring, most commonly through some form of assisted re-
production. 4' Further, it can be attributed simply to widespread
use and societal demand.
Because views evolved over time in favor of surrogacy, legisla-
tion has been somewhat unsuccessful in regulating its use and
serves only to impede the development of safe procedures and so-
cial change. When courts refuse to enforce surrogacy agreements,
they empower surrogate mothers to commit extortion-as the
surrogate would have incentive to threaten to renege in order to
get more money. This would result in greater cost to both par-
ties-it would be more expensive for intended parents looking for
a surrogate (as they would have to screen potential surrogates
more carefully) and the surrogate would presumably receive a
lower price (since her performance would be uncertain). These
scenarios illustrate the productive value of enforcing contracts.
Within this context, this part addresses persisting ethical con-
cerns with surrogacy and gamete donation, including concerns
about commodification, lack of access, exploitation, and lack of
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In re Baby S, 128 A.3d 296, 304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (quoting Ferguson v. McKi-
ernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1245 (Pa. 2007)).
45. Id. at 306.
46. Santosh Kumar Mishra, An Insight into Access to Fertility Treatment by Gay, Les-
bians, and Unmarried Persons-Changing Nature of Reproduction and Family, INT'L J.
REPROD. FERTILITY & SEXUAL HEALTH (Oct. 29, 2014), http://scidoc.org/articlepdfs/IJR
FSH/IJRFSH-2377-1887-01-301.pdf.
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true consent. It highlights ways in which these concerns can be
linked, more generally, to the fear that the practices of surrogacy
and gamete donation will compromise notions of American moth-
erhood, as well as to an undeniable ongoing backlash against
women's reproductive freedom and autonomy.
1. The Sacredness of Motherhood and the Fear of
Commodification
A dominant fear associated with ART is related to the dignity
of personhood-this fear is rooted in notions about the commodifi-
cation of babies and the conflation of economic exchange and in-
timacy.4 7 Some critics fear that the market and the commerciali-
zation of reproductive tissues could undermine personhood,
turning "unique individuals into fungible entities with monetary
values."48 For example, there is fear of baby factories in India and
other countries, where thriving surrogacy markets are used by
wealthy Americans and Europeans seeking unregulated use of
wombs ."
There are concerns about a future that might resemble life in
the dystopian Republic of Gilead, as described in the fictional ac-
count of the production of babies by abducted fertile women who
are designated as Handmaids and treated as vessels, told by
Margaret Atwood in The Handmaid's Tale.5" Additionally, there is
47. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 218
(2012).
48. Id.
49. Margaret Ryznar, International Commercial Surrogacy and Its Parties, 43 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1009, 1028 (2010).
50. See generally MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1987). The Handmaid's
Tale is set in the dystopia of Gilead in the speculative, not-too-distant future. The narra-
tor, known to us only as Offred (literally "Of-Fred," having been stripped of her own name)
tells of a region of the United States taken over by a fundamentalist insurgency. This the-
ocratic regime forces women into total subservience, in keeping with the Gileadean inter-
pretation of Christian Scripture. Years of pollution and abuse of the environment have
resulted in widespread infertility, and the society is reorganized around breeding. Fertile
women are abducted, designated as Handmaids, and sent to an indoctrination facility.
When their "training" is complete, they are assigned to male elites (Commanders) and go
to live in their households under the supervision of the Commanders' Wives. This supervi-
sion is no mere thing: in keeping with the Gileadean interpretation of the Biblical story of
Rachel and her handmaid Bilhah, while the Commander copulates with his Handmaid,
the Wife must maintain physical contact with her. This makes any child that results from
the Ceremony legally and morally the child of the Wife, who takes possession of the new-
born immediately. Handmaids, for their part, are treated solely as vessels. Those who do
not become pregnant after being assigned to three different Commanders are designated
Unwomen and shipped out to the hinterlands, where they are given the job of cleaning up
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a fear that the practice of surrogacy will lead to the commerciali-
zation of child bearing driven by profit-making motives of bro-
kers. It has been argued that this is a natural consequence of
human desire and an unalterable consequence of modern technol-
ogy. 51 This "anti-commodification" position is another way courts
seek to protect intimate relations from the market, which, some
believe, could undermine the dignity of marriage, "denigrate the
emotional significance of home labor,"52 and "violate the norms of
love that are supposed to govern marital relations" and mother-
hood.53
The commodification concern with surrogacy and gamete dona-
tion stems, at least in part, from the fear that technology will di-
minish the sacredness of pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood.
While historically, marital love making and baby making have
gone hand in hand, surrogacy and gamete donation involve a
medical intervention that necessarily separates procreation from
love and sexual intercourse, which can take on a meaningful sig-
nificance to some people.
By itself, technology does not threaten the institution of moth-
erhood, and in fact many parents praise the advancement of med-
ical science for helping them to conceive and carry children to
term. 4 However, ART is sometimes used by commercial fertility
clinics to allow families to plan for the future, often for the con-
venience of the career woman, or to implant embryos in surro-
gates who provide surrogacy in exchange for payment.55 In these
toxic waste. If they are lucky enough to become pregnant during their "service," the babies
they bear are handed over to the Wives. Id.
51. See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M,
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 75 (2007).
52. Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 81, 95 (1997).
53. Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 500
(2005). However, this argument favoring the regulation of economic exchanges in the
household reinforces the gendered nature of home labor and disproportionately harms
poorer people, usually poor women. Failure to enforce interspousal contracts undervalues
the labor associated with the marital relationship. See id.
54. See Alan Boudreau, Are You My Mommy? Determining Parentage in Modern
Families, Address at American Bar Association 2014 Spring CLE Conference (May 8,
2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/familylaw/2014/05/section of
_familylawspringcleconference/4_thur-parentage.authcheckdam.pdf. The CDC's latest da-
ta estimates that almost 68,000 infants were born into the United States in 2013 due to
ART interventions. U.S. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL SuMMARY REPORT 3 (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2013-re
port/art_2013_national summary report.pdf.
55. See, e.g., Fertility and My Career: The Working Woman's Dilemma, THE LONDON
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scenarios, technology threatens to remove the sacredness of
childbirth by divorcing the natural, instinct-driven desire to have
children from reproduction. Reproduction is no longer sacred
when a woman carries a child she has no desire to raise, when
she gives her eggs to a fertility clinic so she can pay her student
loans, or when she harvests her eggs for the future with acknowl-
edgement that she does not want to have children yet.56 These
women all benefit from ART in ways that do not reaffirm mother-
hood as something women want above their careers or cash. In
other words, these modern reproductive desires reveal the con-
troversy of ART and surrogacy as deeply rooted in the stigma of
selfish women, or worse women motivated by financial ambition
who might exploit reproductive technology for their own sefish
57purposes.
American culture heralds a natural mother-child bond. One
website explained, "The bond between a mother and her child has
been recognized and celebrated as uniquely powerful and beauti-
ful for countless millennia." 8 Another website rounded up quotes
from mothers, including: "The relationship of mother and child
remains indelible and indescribable ... the strongest bond on
earth"; "[a] mother's love is like a circle-it has no beginning and
no ending"; and "[m]others love is the fuel that enables a normal
human being to do the impossible."5 Another website explains,
"The bond between mom and child will always be one of the
strongest. A mother's love is unconditional, unselfish and knows
no end. A mother's love for her children is so sacred, it is quite
WOMEN'S CLINIC (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.londonwomensclinic.com/blog/post/fertility-
and-my-career-the-working-womans-dilemma (describing the many options of ART treat-
ments available to working women).
56. "The press is awash with warnings about delaying motherhood and the short-
sighted selfishness of career-hungry women who suddenly realize that 'Motherhood' is in
its final week of release and it's now or never." Gillian Ragsdale, The Maternal Myth: Why
Motherhood Can Be Such a Tough Decision, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 18, 2013), https://
www.psychologytoday.com/blog/kith-and-kin/201312/the-maternal-myth.
57. See, e.g., Wendy Tuohy, Freezing Your Eggs: How 30-Something Single Women are
Challenging Infertility, HERALD SUN (Nov. 21, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.heraldsun.com.
au/news/victoria/freexing-your-eggs-how-30something-single-women-are-challenging-infer
tility/news-story/c6808220f53920f8ea5c41d18126ebe3 (dismissing the notion that women
who have eggs frozen are "selfish career women").
58. Mother-Baby Bond: The Biology of Love, THE VISUAL MD, https://www.thevisual
md.com/health-centers/child-health/mother-babybond the biologyof love/mother baby_
bond the biologyoflove (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
59. Quotes from a Mother: Love and Survival, http://quotesfromamomloveandsurviv
al.blogspot.com/2008/08/unbreakable-bond-mother-and-child.html (last visited Dec. 16,
2016).
2017]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
hard to put into words."6 But what happens to that bond when
motherhood is dissected into two parts-the provider of the egg
and the gestational carrier? And what happens when a woman
chooses to have a baby that she will immediately give up to the
intended parents?
Surrogate mothers do not fit into the paradigm of women being
the "good mother." Rather, surrogate women are sometimes seen
as deviant mothers, making the decision to give up a child before
getting pregnant and violating the sacred bond between mother
and child in the process. A mother, either through biology or
through carrying the baby, who gives up her child is often
thought to break that indelible bond and violate a sacred rela-
tionship. It does not help that the language of surrogacy reinforc-
es such notions of the "good mother;" for example, delineating be-
tween traditional and gestational surrogacy, commercial and
noncommercial surrogacy, and using the word "donation" when
referring to gamete transfer.6"
It is also historically thought that women have an instinctual
desire to be mothers. People often speak of the "biological urge"
and "women's biological instinct to have children."62 Young girls
are taught child bearing is something that is supposed to, and
will, happen in their own lives. Conversely, one rarely hears
about men having the same urge. The idea perpetuates the view
that 'normal' women experience an instinctual longing from
within to have a child, and if they did not there is something
wrong with them." 6 The deep feeling that some women may have
of wanting to have children, however, most likely stems from so-
cial and cultural influences, not biological ones.64 Nonetheless,
when a woman agrees to carry a child for another woman and
agrees to give up that baby after presumably forming the inevita-
60. Nadia Carriere, The Best Quotes-Sayings About Mothers and Mamas, DISNEY
BABY (Aug. 13, 2008), https://www.disneybaby.com/uncategorized/the-best-quotes-about-
mom-mother-mama-our-best-friend.
61. See, e.g., Brian Manning, Surrogacy Terms: Gestational Carrier vs. Surrogate,
CIRCLE SURROGACY (May 6, 2014), http:www.circlesurrogacy.com/blog/2014/05/06/surro
gacy-terms-gestational-carrier-vs-surrogate/ (discussing the implications of using the
terms "gestational carrier" and "surrogate").
62. Laura Carroll, The "Biological Urge" What's the Truth?, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
10, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-carroll/childfree b 1752906.ht
ml.
63. Id.
64. Gary L. Brase & Sandra L. Brase, Emotional Regulation of Fertility Decision Mak-
ing: What is the Nature and Structure of "Baby Fever'?, 12 EMOTION 1141, 1151-52 (2012).
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ble bond with it, she is often viewed as violating these sacred be-
liefs about womanhood and motherhood.
65
Notions of the "good mother" are often found and reinforced in
pop culture. It is all too common in gossip magazines or celebrity
blogs to find public praise for the woman who utilizes reproduc-
tive technology to give her the child she has always wanted and
fought hard to conceive." The narratives typically strive to make
ART palpable for the reader, highlighting the heartbreak of the
intended mother who could not conceive and carry a child her-
self, 7 or the altruistic motives of a surrogate who unselfishly
gives of herself to a couple."8 Gestational surrogates, and the fer-
tility clinics that assist in contracting them to potential parents,
present a particularly careful narrative about the desire to give a
couple the unselfish gift of surrogacy. Indeed, surrogacy is often
referred to as a "gift," and fertility websites typically talk about
the gift of helping an infertile couple." For example, one fertility
website defines "surrogate" as "one who gives of herself so that
others may experience the joy of parenting" and highlights the
descriptions behind the word as including "[1]ove, selflessness,
willingness, [and] generosity."7 Many fertility agencies have web-
65. See, e.g., Arland K. Nichols, Why Surrogacy Violates Human Dignity, CRISIS MAG.
(Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.crisismagazine.com/2015/surrogacy (stating that "[s]urrogate
motherhood represents an objective failure to meet the obligations of maternal love, of con-
jugal fidelity and of responsible motherhood").
66. See, e.g., Anna Alemendrala, 12 Celebrities Who Have Opened Up About 1VF and
Surrogacy, HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/12-celebrities-who-have-opened-up-about-ivf-and-surrogacy-us-575a22cfe4b~ced23c
a7a74a ("The thing that unites them all, in addition to grief over miscarriages and failed
IVF attempts, is their hope to complete their families on their own terms. Read on and be
inspired.").
67. See, e.g., Tim Nudd, Giuliana Rancic is Expecting a Baby, PEOPLE (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20589362,00.html (reporting that Giuliana Rancic
is "one step closer to having the baby that she and husband Bill Rancic have always
dreamed about" and that her "prayers have been answered" after her road to motherhood
was "made difficult by infertility struggles, one miscarriage and a diagnosis of breast can-
cer").
68. See, e.g., 10 Celebrity Parents Who Used a Surrogate, SUGGEST.COM, http://www.
suggest.com/lifestyle/2107/10-celebrity-parents-who-used-a-surrogate/#page=1 (last visited
Dec. 16, 2016) (noting that one celebrity found her surrogate to be "extraordinary" while
another celebrity was so grateful that would "give [his] life for the woman who helped
bring my sons into this world").
69. See, e.g., Becoming a Surrogate, AM. REPROD. CTRS., http://www.arcbabies.com/in
dex.php/treatments/surrogacybecoming-a-surrogate (last visited Dec. 16, 2016) (stating
that surrogates will be able to help give the "gift of life" to an infertile couple and "achieve
their greatest dream of bringing a child into this world").
70. The Gift of Surrogacy, ANU FERTILITY CONSULTANTS (May 30, 2015), http://www.
surrogacyincanada.com/new-blog-post/.
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sites with headings, such as "The Gift of Surrogacy,"71 or "Surro-
gacy-Giving the Ultimate Gift of Life."72 When reproductive
technology is used to provide "gifts," the presumption is that it
has no place in the market economy, profit motives should be
questioned, and contracts should not be enforced.
Women who receive payment for surrogacy must demonstrate
that their motives are in line with societal notions that mother-
hood should be a sacred gift, and should not involve a paycheck.
When surrogacy is praised as offering the ultimate gift, it be-
comes a newsworthy event when a woman "donates" her eggs
with the simple motivation to make money. For example, the title
of one news story about an egg donor was, "Woman Donates Eggs
for Rent Money," loosely suggesting that the reason she was do-
nating her eggs is suspect.73 In the article, the writer explains
that Stephanie, the donor, was "[s]trapped for cash," and would
not be donating her eggs, if it weren't for "the faltering econo-
my."74 The judgment is implicit.
One of the most lasting voices in this controversy is Elizabeth
S. Anderson, who argues that a woman's labor is beyond the
realm of the market-that pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood
are a labor too sacred to be commodified.1 Her thesis, and the
overwhelming response to her scholarship since, demonstrates
that the stigma of reproductive technology lies not in the fear of
the future possibilities of ART, but instead, in the growing threat
of motherhood traded on the commercial market. It is a simul-
taneously obvious and nuanced threat to gender expectations: a
woman can conceive, carry, and raise a child, but she must do it
71. The Gift of Surrogacy, BUILDING FAMILIES, INC., https://www.buildingfamiliesinc.
com/en/2010/12/the-gift-of-surrogacy/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
72. Surrogacy-Giving the Ultimate Gift, FAM. INCEPTIONS INT'L, http://www.family
inceptions.com/surrogacy-giving-the-ultimate-gift-of-life/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
73. Russell Goldman, Woman Donates Eggs For Rent Money, ABC NEWS (Aug. 11,
2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=5533309&page=l.
74. Id. Shelly Smith, Director of the Egg Donor Program in Los Angeles, stated, "[w]e
always hope people are donating for altruistic reasons, but we know money is part of it."
Id.
75. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71,
71 (1990).
76. Id. at 91-92; see also Alan Wertheimer, Two Questions About Surrogacy and Ex-
ploitation, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 211, 211 (1995) (arguing that surrogacy will not under-
mine or replace unconditional parental love with love conditioned on market principles
because unconditional love is already impossible). But see Steven D. Hales, The Impossi-
bility of Unconditional Love, 9 PUB. AFF. Q. 317, 318-20 (1992).
[Vol. 51:419
FAMILIES IN THE AGE OF ART
out of love for the child, and never as a participant in the market
economy.
The fallacy of the notion that motherhood, and families in gen-
eral, should be held sacred and should not be traded in the mar-
ket economy is that motherhood and reproduction are already
traded in the market economy in scenarios that are not generally
questioned. For one thing, clinics and laboratories will continue to
profit in this industry, even if the surrogate and gamete donors
are not compensated (the distaste for surrogacy is not a blanket
aversion-it generally occurs only when it is in exchange for
monetary compensation).
Other examples of motherhood being traded in the market in-
clude maids and nannies, who do the traditional gendered work of
keeping a house and raising children. The distinction between a
market for women who carry an embryo to term for payment and
a market for live-in nannies that raise five-year-olds for a
paycheck is thin. To argue that these women or the markets they
operate within are vastly different because of the reproductive la-
bor involved ignores the fact that a live-in nanny is also deeply
physically and emotionally engaged with a child she did not carry
herself. This distinction that stigmatizes one form of motherhood
traded on the market but rationalizes the other is separated by
this ephemeral notion of sacredness for the former, but never the
latter.
This sacredness not only acts to remove reproductive labor like
surrogacy from the marketplace, it also bears down on the market
value of all gendered labor, doing a disservice to the work of all
women who seek a fair wage. The paradigm of exalting sacred in-
stitutions of womanhood and motherhood, as above the market,
historically serves to undermine the market value of gendered
work typically performed in the home, such as home healthcare
or domestic work. The fact is the market already assigns mone-
tary value to childcare, housework, adoption, and other gendered
labor, and compensates non-family members for that work. How-
ever, when performed by family members, the monetary value of
the work is not only lost, but too taboo to articulate in a contract.
Consequently, the value of "women's work" becomes illegible and
deeply undervalued in the market economy.
Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo captured the trap of financial am-
bitions in gendered work pitted against altruistic notions of
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motherhood when she interviewed a couple, the Ross Family. The
family was livid when their live-in nanny, Carmen, asked for a
raise, seemingly out of nowhere:
"We kind of had a blowup, and then she started acting really incon-
siderate about her position, in my opinion," recalls Mrs. Ross .... I
just felt really bad, and I said, 'Gosh, it's apparent that you don't ap-
preciate what you have here. I try to have a nice house for you to live
in, and I never ask you to do something that I wouldn't do myself.'
... I said, 'Is money just really all that's important to you?'
Indeed, it was the suggestion that Carmen was motivated as much
by her wages as by love for the Ross children that stung her employ-
er most.
The dynamic playing out between Mrs. Ross and Carmen
shows the ingrained expectations of women with children, even
when the children are not their own. This dynamic is even more
salient when considering that Mrs. Ross was a working woman
herself, and the idea of leaving her children at home with a nan-
ny cut both ways for her. However, it never dawned on Mrs. Ross
during this interaction that a nanny affords her the opportunity
to fully participate in the job market. To Mrs. Ross, Carmen
should be motivated by love for her children first.
While compensating individuals for donating gametes or being
surrogates can raise some ethical concerns as discussed above,
not compensating gamete donors and surrogates can raise coun-
ter ethical concerns, such as devaluing women's work and de-
creased supply of eggs and sperm. A free market of gametes ulti-
mately benefits all parties-gamete providers get the compen-
sation they desire, and those willing to pay for such gametes get
the reproductive tissues they need to undergo assisted reproduc-
tion.
Overall, on moral grounds, the social expectation that mothers
commit to raising children as their ultimate life project, that they
cherish motherhood over all other competing values, and that
they perform the labor of motherhood out of pure altruism and
love of their particular biological children, is a traditional social
prejudice, arbitrary in that females happen to get pregnant while
men do not. Even assuming the "naturalness" of such motherly
dispositions, it does not overcome the naturalistic fallacy (the er-
77. Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Blowups and Other Unhappy Endings, in GLOBAL
WOMEN: NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 55, 60 (Barbara Eh-
renreich & Arlie Russell Hachschild eds., 2003).
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ror of deriving an "ought" from an "is"). The surrogate's decision
to bring forth the conditions for flourishing childhood and parent-
hood, whether for an infertile sister or an anonymous gay couple,
respects the dignity of both. Enlightened society and the law both
have come to understand parenthood as a moral relationship ra-
ther than a biological one, and the best interest of the child as be-
ing determined by social conditions and functional parenthood,
not biological relations.
2. The Problems of Exploitation and Informed Consent
In addition to commodification and market concerns, many
feminists and others worry about the bodily exploitation of wom-
en who choose to sell their genetic material or use their bodies to
carry a child for others.78 It is thought that the consent in those
cases is not truly voluntary, or is weakened by the need for finan-
cial compensation and power disparities." The suggestion is that
surrogacy is exploitative because only poor women are amenable
to the working conditions of surrogacy."s When middle class wom-
en act as surrogates, the belief is that they are verifiably motivat-
ed by altruism because they would not have to make that choice
to be a surrogate otherwise. However, protecting against the risk
of exploitation has "resulted in paternalistic rulings and regula-
tions restricting the practice of commercial surrogacy throughout
the United States," and "impermissibly restrict[ed] women's au-
tonomy and freedom to contract."8'
Notions of exploitation tend to be predicated on the market's
valuation of surrogacy. Because of social expectations that women
would serve as surrogates for free, the economic value of surroga-
cy has been driven down to approximately three dollars an hour
or, in some cases, as low as fifty cents an hour." If surrogacy were
valued higher based on the emotional commitment and physical
78. For a survey of articles addressing the possible exploitation of surrogates, see
Yehezkel Margalit, In Defense of Surrogacy Agreements: A Modern Contract Law Perspec-
tive, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 430-31, nn.24-28, 30-31 (2014).
79. Id. at 430-32.
80. Id.
81. Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surroga-
cy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 392 (2012).
82. Elisabeth Eaves, Want To Work For $3 an Hour?, FORBES (July 24, 2009, 12:00
AM), http://www.forbes.comI2009/07123/surrogate-motherhood-minimum-wage-opinions-co
lumnists-elisabeth-eaves.html; Jane E. Brody, Much Has Changed in Surrogate Pregnan-
cies, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/healthi21brod.html.
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labor involved, perhaps the market might demand higher prices
for surrogacy, thus diversifying the economic situation of many
surrogates. The presumptions are based on the fundamental
premise that, absent an altruistic motive, women would not
choose to use their bodies in these ways, unless they were being
exploited. The catch-22 is that many women who are surrogates
are not driven by financial rewards to begin with, further illus-
trating the pervasive notion that women want to carry children
for others, and not for their own rewards-inescapable cultural
assumptions.
The exploitation of women by intended parents with more so-
cial power is a concern that can be addressed in seven ways: (1)
studies show that most surrogates do not make rash decisions
without full knowledge and assent; (2) the standard contract de-
fenses of duress and unconscionability check for vulnerability and
unfairness; (3) it is in the intended parents' interest that the sur-
rogate have previous children and is not primarily motivated by
payment; (4) prohibition will lead to reproductive tourism, exac-
erbating the likelihood for exploitation and distorting the market
price; (5) altruistic surrogacy is arguably more exploitative of the
labor of labor; (6) exploitation is a greater concern in housing and
employment where the state takes a laissez-faire attitude in favor
of freedom of contract; and (7) the argument that it is bad to pay
women for something that is bad for them is founded on circular
reasoning.
First, to presume that a woman is unable to grant consent to be
a surrogate or donate eggs, or to any other reproductive choices,
presumes that all women experience the same unbreakable sa-
cred bond with the unborn child and the same emotional effects of
pregnancy. It presumes that all women have a natural "maternal
instinct" that would prevent them from ever voluntarily relin-
quishing a child. This set of presumptions buys into deep-seeded
but untested cultural values and severely undermines women's
autonomy and contractual freedom. Indeed, rather than making
rash, shallow decisions regarding surrogacy, one commenter indi-
cated that "[p]arties to a surrogacy contract generally wait an av-
erage of four months before the first attempt to conceive, suggest-
ing careful consideration preceding pregnancy and allowing the
surrogate to evaluate the magnitude of her decision."83 In a relat-
83. London, supra note 81, at 401.
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ed study, empirical research showed that based on qualitative in-
terviews with 130 IVF patients and ninety fertility care providers
as well as 260 online patient surveys, most patients have surpris-
ingly positive consent behaviors with respect to informed consent
documents and conversations, including reading forms, reading
forms closely, and finding forms comprehensible. 4 As a result, de-
spite some well-publicized cases, problems of contested surrogacy
are somewhat rare.8 5
Restricting a woman's procreative autonomy and freedom of
contract "imposes a detriment on women under the guise of pro-
tecting surrogates from exploitation."8 As shown above, not all
women relate to childbearing in the same way. Rather than mak-
ing presumptions based on the sanctity of reproduction and
motherhood, presumptions are better served that are in favor of
the competence of surrogates who are exercising their right to
self-determination by making thoughtful and informed decisions.
Second, contract law already contains protections against ex-
ploitative and unfair contract provisions: the defenses of economic
duress, undue influence, and unconscionability. All three defens-
es ask the factual question of whether the weaker party effective-
ly had alternative courses of action available and whether she en-
tered into the contract voluntarily with full knowledge.87
If, for example, choices are made about how many embryos to create,
how many to implant, and how to track and store frozen gametes,
reproductive materials, and embryos without discussion with the
parties supplying them and if those providing reproductive services
do not provide accurate and timely information about the risks of
fertility-enhancing drugs, success rates using different techniques,
and costs, then choice is illusory, especially in an area as sensitive
and as defining of personal self-image as reproduction.88
84. Jody L. Madeira, The ART of Informed Consent: Assessing Patient Perceptions,
Behaviors, and Lived Experience of IVF and Embryo Disposition Informed Consent Pro-
cesses, 49 FAM. L.Q. 7, 9 (2015).
85. Jessica Grose, The Sherri Shepherd Surrogacy Case Is a Mess. Prepare for More
Like It., SLATE (Apr. 28, 2015, 5:54 PM), http:/lwww.slate.com/blogs/xx factor/2015/04/28/
sherri_shepherd surrogacy-case-there_s little consensus on the ethical dimensions.
html; Craig Dashiell, Note, From Louise Brown to Baby M and Beyond: A Proposed
Framework for Understanding Surrogacy, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 851, 869, n.145 (2013).
86. London, supra note 81, at 409.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
88. ARTHUR L. CAPLAN, AM I MY BROTHER'S KEEPER: THE ETHICAL FRONTIERS OF
BIOMEDICINE 6 (1997).
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Consent must include extensive counseling about the inherent
medical and emotional benefits and risks associated with most
forms of ART, and participants must participate voluntarily and
without coercion or undue influence. 89
Contract law already maintains the tools to conduct these types
of analyses. Contracts for which assent is not truly voluntary will
not be enforced. In fact, if surrogacy contracts are not enforced as
against public policy, the surrogate or the intended parents will
be much better positioned to exploit the other party without re-
course. The surrogate may refuse to give up the baby unless paid
more money. The intended parents may refuse to pay medical
costs unless the surrogate acquiesces to unreasonable demands.
Third, the available statistics suggest that surrogates in the
United States are not generally exploited. The American surroga-
cy agency ConceiveAbilities, typical of American surrogacy agen-
cies, maintains requirements for potential surrogates that align
with the interests of intended parents. 90 Surrogates must not be
on "government financial support," "have given birth to and be
raising at least one child," have "[n]o history of clinical mental
illness," "agree to psychological testing," have a "[s]table, respon-
sible lifestyle," and be "[f]inancially sound."91
NPR's four-part series, "Making Babies: 21st Century Fami-
lies," identifies Macy Widofsky as representative of American
surrogates. 92 She had already undergone "easy pregnancies."93 She
"wanted to repeat the process."94 Another surrogate explained
that, "[y]es, it's a business contract in a sense, but it's so much
more than that.9 5 Whether or not payment is the primary moti-
vation, the payment secures the relationship and eliminates un-
certainty, symbolic of commitment.
89. See Sara Cotton et al., Model Assisted Reproductive Technology Act, 9 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 55, 66 (2005).
90. See Surrogacy Requirements, CONCEIVEABILITIES, https://www.conceiveabilities.
com/surrogates/surrogate-requirements (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
91. Id.
92. Marisa Pefialoza, Carrying 'Dreams'- Why Women Become Surrogates, NPR (Apr.
17, 2012, 6:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/17/150589059/carrying-dreams-why-wom
en-become-surrogates.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Surrogates are generally not wealthy, but are also, for the most
part, far from desperately poor. According to The Atlantic's anal-
ysis:
The typical profile runs like this: married, Christian, middle class,
with two to three biological children, working a part-time job, living
in a small town or suburb rather than a big city, with a degree of col-
lege education but usually without a college degree .... In the Unit-
ed States, statistics show that surrogates fall into the average
household income category of under $60,000. About 15 to 20 percent
are military wives. Some are single women. Those who are married
have husbands who support paid surrogacy.... They have health in-
surance. . . . Of the women who serve as surrogates for [the Center
for Surrogate Parenting ("CSP")], roughly 35 percent repeat the ex-
perience.
CSP is representative of the vast majority of surrogacy agencies
in their strict criterion for surrogates:
Ethical surrogacy agencies and lawyers [do not] accept two specific
categories of potential surrogates. First, they reject women below the
poverty level who may be at greater risk for health concerns and co-
ercion, and who probably do not have medical insurance. Second,
they reject women who [do not] have children.
97
Fourth, history has shown that tighter regulation or prohibi-
tion of surrogacy will lead to "reproductive tourism," such as the
use of surrogates by American intended parents in China, India,
Brazil, and elsewhere, where surrogacy is cheaper and there is no
way to determine a fair market price.98 Prohibition and regulation
in the United States will lead to a higher risk of exploitation be-
cause society-to-society exploitation is prone to be hidden from
view, to be susceptible to objectification of the foreign other, and
to become an institutionalized, unregulated black market.
Fifth, prohibition of commercial surrogacy alongside the per-
missibility of altruistic surrogacy risks a more pernicious form of
exploitation whereby the labor of the woman is not viewed by the
courts as labor in the economic sense. This view dismisses the
woman as an autonomous economic agent and reinforces the so-
cial prejudice that the work of a woman in the home and for the
family has no economic value. This belief is rooted in impermissi-
96. Leslie Morgan Steiner, Who Becomes a Surrogate?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.the atlantic.com/healthlarchive/2013/i I/who-becomes-a-surrogate/281596/.
97. Id.
98. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the Global Mar-
ket for Fertility Services, 27 L. & INEQ. 277, 277-78, 285, 296-97 (2009).
2017]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ble, overgeneralized gender stereotypes, deemed unconstitution-
al. 9 Respect for the surrogate's economic autonomy requires that
payment is at least permissible, if not morally obligatory.
Sixth, critiques invoking duress, inequality, and amoral
wealth-maximizing choices made by the intended parents and the
surrogate are more coherently and usefully made against the
market economy as a whole, rather than against selective con-
tract provisions that can, under certain circumstances, illustrate
structural market failures. Contract law exists within the market
economy, not the other way around. Exploitation critiques are
best leveled, for example, at owner-employee and owner-tenant
relationships where the less powerful party seeks the necessities
of life. Surrogacy is distinguished in that the surrogate enters the
contractual relationship freely and does not seek a necessity of
life. It is a hypocrisy for the state to adopt a laissez-faire attitude
toward employment, housing, healthcare, and predatory loans,
yet to concern itself with the commodification of human beings
when women's reproductive autonomy is at stake.
The inconsistency suggests an alternative motive: restricting
women's reproductive choices. The legislative histories of states
and the federal government indicate a trend of animosity toward
women's reproductive autonomy under the cloak of rationaliza-
tions, insisting that the intent of the legislation is either to pro-
tect public morality or women's health."' This animosity is evi-
dent in the legal regulation of private reproductive issues such as
the use of contraception and abortion.101
99. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996).
100. See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. H23-24 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2016) (statement of Rep. Wag-
ner).
101. Beginning with the Comstock laws in 1873, Congress outlawed the Postal Service
from transporting all erotic literature, contraceptives, abortifacients, and sex toys for the
sake of eliminating the "obscene" from society. See Law of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, § 2, 17
Stat. 599, invalidated by Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61, 70, 75
(1983). It was not until 1983 that the Supreme Court ruled that such intrusions into citi-
zens' mailboxes were unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment. Bolger, 463 U.S.
at 61, 75. Recently, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statutes that prescribed, in
the words of the Court, "[u]nnecessary health regulations," requiring abortion providers to
have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the facility even though, the
Court writes, "[t]he great weight of evidence demonstrates that, before the act's passage,
abortion in Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of serious complications
and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the procedure." Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300, 2302 (2016) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992); Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684
(W.D. Tex. 2014)). No leap of the imagination is required to infer the intent of the Texas
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Finally, to argue that it is inherently exploitative to pay a
woman for something that is bad for her is an obvious instance of
circular reasoning at best and undue paternalism at worst.
3. The Problem of Unequal Access
Another legitimate concern with surrogacy contracting is its
high cost, prohibiting equal access. This is an incidental outcome.
Income inequality is the culprit to be addressed on its own. Uni-
versal healthcare is one answer-and PGD could be an impetus
and clear example of the stake society has in equality.
In some ways, surrogacy mirrors a typical commercial transac-
tion, where two contracting parties each voluntarily agree to give
up something in order to get something they value more-a fertile
woman seeking financial compensation, trading with an infertile
couple who desires a baby. With the commodity in great demand,
supply and demand takes hold to set a market price. From there,
free markets work and government interference would only im-
pose costs on society.
In this paradigm, the elevated cost of surrogacy is unlikely to
persist--competition among clinics, as well as increased techno-
logical efficiency over time, will eventually drive the price down,
as happens with most new technologies. For example, the average
price of a new twenty-one-inch television went from $2495 in
1948, to $495 in 1960, to $260 in 1972, to about $100 today.0 2
Similarly, in 2011, the original price of a 16 GB iPad 2 was $499;
in 2012, the price dropped to $399.13 That same iPad can now be
purchased for much less.0 In the end, competition among clinics
will improve the quality of ART services and drive the price
down.
state legislature.
102. See TV Selling Prices, TELEVISION HISTORY-THE FIRST 75 YEARS, http://www.tv
history.tv/tv-prices.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
103. See iPad 2, APPLE-HISTORY, http://apple-history.com/ipad_2 (last visited Dec. 16,
2016).
104. See Brett Molina, Apple Cuts Prices, Boost Storage on iPads, USA TODAY (Sept. 8,
2016, 9:27 AM), www.usatoday.com/techlnews/2016/09/08/apple-cuts-prices-boost-storage-
ipads/89993382/. See generally Andrew Krabeepetcharat, Advanced Technology Drives
Prices Down, MEDIA CTR. (July 23, 2014), http://media.ibisworld.com/2014/07/23/advan
ced-media-drives-technology-prices/ (discussing that increased competition and technologi-
cal advances cause a decline in prices for consumer technology devices, such as flash
drives and e-readers).
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If universal healthcare is not feasible, then the high cost of
ART can also be remedied if states require insurance coverage,
which might eventually happen organically as views on surrogacy
continue to evolve and surrogacy becomes more commonplace.
Overall, there are better ways to combat access issues than limit-
ing reproductive freedom and restricting the use of the important
technology altogether.
B. Pre-Implantation Genetic Testing and Parent Choice
Through the use of assisted reproduction, prospective parents
today often have a say about some of the actual or potential fea-
tures of their child-to-be. Debate has flourished about what de-
gree of discretion would-be parents should have, specifically in
choosing the gender, race, and other physical characteristics of
embryos to implant."5
PGD was introduced in 1990 for genetic analysis of embryos
developed through IVF.1 °6 This technology offers the ability to
characterize the genetic composition of embryos prior to embryo
transfer, allowing doctors to diagnose hereditary and serious dis-
eases and allowing parents to screen their future children from
those diseases, even before conception."7 Because embryos are
tested prior to implantation, parents are able to avoid invasive
post-conception diagnostic procedures, such as amniocentesis and
chorionic villus sampling."8 In the event that the screening re-
sults in an unfavorable diagnosis and the parents decide not to
continue with the implantation, they avoid the decision and the
potential trauma of having an abortion."9 PGD is generally con-
sidered safe and has undeniable benefits when used to diagnose
genetic disorders."0
105. See Debora L. Spar, As You Like It: Exploring the Limits of Parental Choice in As-
sisted Reproduction, 27 L. & INEQ. 481, 485 (2009).
106. See Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Jean Cohen, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 87
FERTILITY & STERILITY S47, S47 (Supp. 2007).
107. See Susannah Baruch, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Parental Prefer-
ences: Beyond Deadly Disease, 8 HOUSING J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245, 247-48 (2008).
108. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 265, 278-80 (2003).
109. Molina B. Dayal, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, MEDSCAPE (Dec. 30, 2015),
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/273415-overview#al; Botkin, supra note 108, at
281.
110. See Spar, supra note 105, at 485; Ronald Bailey, Warning! Bioethics Can Be Haz-
ardous to Health, MED. ECON. (Oct. 25, 1999), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.
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Embryo manipulation technology has resulted in overwhelm-
ingly positive medical outcomes. PGD helps identify genetic de-
fects within embryos to prevent diseases or disorders from being
passed on to the child."' "Since its introduction .. .it has been
most widely used to prevent the birth of children with conditions
such as Down's syndrome, Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, sick-
le cell, Huntington's chorea, and Cooley's anemia.""' 2 It has also
increasingly been used to create "savior siblings," with matching
bone marrow or other tissues to transplant in older siblings who
are sick."' There is no cure for many genetic conditions discov-
ered through PGD and available treatments often carry great
risks. PGD can also identify, before implantation, embryos that
are of poor quality and likely to result in a miscarriage."4
However, significant ethical questions arise about the use of
PGD. Many of the ethical problems that critics have with this
technology are the same as with surrogacy and gamete donation.
As with surrogacy, much of the push against use of this technolo-
gy stems from untested ideas about the sanctity of reproduction
and notions that childbirth should be natural."' The traditional
belief is that children are a sacred "gift from God," and should be
loved regardless of specific traits."6 Childbirth should not involve
com/medical-economics/news/clinical/obstetrics-gynecology-womens-health/warning-bioeth
ics-can-be-hazardous (noting "the birth defect rate for IFVF babies ... is lower than for
children who are born in the normal way").
111. See Botkin, supra note 108, at 280-81.
112. About Genetic Selection, CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC'Y, http://www.geneticsandsoci
ety.org/section.php?id=82 (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
113. See Marley McClean, Children's Anatomy v. Children's Autonomy: A Precarious
Balancing Act with Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and the Creation of "Savior Sib-
lings", 43 PEPP. L. REV. 837, 842 (2016).
114. See Mahdi Zahraa & Shaniza Shafie, An Islamic Perspective on IVF and PGD,
with Particular Reference to Zain Hashmi, and Other Similar Cases, 20 ARAB L.Q. 152,
154 (2006). The most recent advances from genetic testing focus on deconstructing the ge-
netic content of an unhealthy female egg to remove disease from the egg and reassembling
it using the genetic material from a healthy donor egg, resulting in a germ cell containing
the genetic material from two different women. See Judith Daar, Multi-Party Parenting in
Genetics and Law: A View from Succession, 49 FAM. L.Q. 71, 73-74 (2015). This technique
is known as mitochondrial manipulation technologies. See id. at 72. When a single sperm
fertilizes that cell, the result is a "three parent embryo" with the DNA from three different
people. See id. at 71. Though issues can arise related to child support, inheritance, and
custody, this procedure is highly beneficial, medically preventing transmission of disease
to the carrier's offspring, while allowing an intended mother with genetic diseases to
maintain a biological connection to her child. See id. at 73-74, 76-77.
115. See Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Pandora's Progeny: Ethical Issues in Assisted Human
Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 745, 752-53 (2005).
116. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. &
MED. 439, 442-43 (2003).
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a deliberate and intellectual process, but rather should be instinc-
tual and natural; the parent-child bond should be unselfish and
unconditional. Reproduction is no longer "sacred" when couples
exploit reproductive technology for their own selfish purposes.
Again, these sacred cultural beliefs remain untested.
As with surrogacy, critics also point to commodification issues
and the lack of equal access to the technology as problems with
trait selection and the use of PGD."7 For example, the use of PGD
for general trait selection will arguably give users who can afford
it a leg up, if and when the technology allows for the creation of
intellectually and physically superior children, further increasing
the class divide. PGD technology is still rapidly advancing and all
possibilities have not yet been realized. As a result, the price of
this technology still remains steep."' But when the technology in-
evitably becomes more commonplace, as with surrogacy, competi-
tion and increased efficiency will cause the price to naturally de-
cline. As with surrogacy, the technology is simply opening the
door to the possibility for a better quality of life. Autonomy should
be paramount.
While many of the arguments and responses are much the
same as with surrogacy, the remainder of this part focuses on the
unique issues that arise with the engineering of embryos. The fo-
cus is whether it is appropriate to use PGD as a means of select-
ing cosmetic characteristics of the embryos to implant and con-
cerns regarding the "designer baby."
Genetic manipulation makes it possible for parents to pick
physical characteristics of their offspring by choosing embryos
solely on the basis of gender, race, or other traits. For example,
California Cryobank, America's largest sperm bank, allows poten-
tial parents to choose from traits including height, weight, educa-
tion, occupation, religion, eye color, hair color, race, and medical
history.'19 Critics fear that allowing trait selection of this sort will
eventually skew the population toward homogeneity or reinforce
and effectuate social prejudices. 2 '
117. See Janet L. Dolgin, Method, Mediations, and the Moral Dimensions of Preimplan-
tation Genetic Diagnosis, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 519, 524-25, n.29 (2005).
118. See id. at 525.
119. See Advanced Search, CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK, https://cryobank.com/search/ (last
visited Dec. 16, 2016).
120. See Laura Damiano, When Parents Can Choose to Have the "Perfect" Child: Why
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Such fears, however, incorrectly analogize pluralistic contem-
porary America with the homogenous, traditional societies of
China and India, or the authoritarian society of early twentieth
century Germany. These fears can also be falsely based on an in-
adequate respect for the priority of the paramount moral princi-
ple of reproductive autonomy. The following will show how the
feared outcomes are purely speculative, and as a result, state in-
terference to prevent such outcomes impermissibly restricts re-
productive autonomy and is not warranted.
1. Sex Selection
The use of technology to sort and separate spermatozoa into X
and Y chromosome groups allows parents to choose to have a
male or female child, even for reasons unrelated to genetic ab-
normalities. Although a 2008 study found that 42 percent of the
clinics surveyed offer gender selection, 2' the practice is still con-
troversial.12  Sex selection for non-medical purposes has generated
perhaps the strongest policy response. Many people believe that
using gender selection for non-medical reasons could lead to the
kind of population skew seen in China and India, and potentially
play a similar role in reinforcing gender stereotypes, 123 while oth-
Fertility Clinics Should Be Required to Report Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Data, 49
FAM. CT. REV. 846, 852 (2011); Richard Hayes, Genetically Modified Humans? No Thanks,
WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2008, 1:47 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/04/15/AR2008041501620_pf.html.
121. Sumathi Reddy, Fertility Clinics Let You Select Your Baby's Sex, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
17, 2015, 1:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fertility-clinics-let-you-select-your-babys-
sex-1439833091.
122. Id.
123. Steve Connor, Medical Ethicist: Ban on Sex Selection of IVF Embryos Is Not Justi-
fied, INDEP. (July 3, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/medical-ethicist-
ban-on-sex-selection-of-ivf-embryos-is-not-justified-8683940.html; see also Shelly Choo,
Chrissy Teigens IVF Backlash: How Common is Baby Sex Choice?, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26,
2016, 12:14 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/womens-healthlchrissy-teigen-s-ivf-back
lash-how-common-baby-sex-choice-n526621. Such practices could also reinforce gender as
a binary construct in general, a practice that some countries are steering away from. In
Sweden, for example, the most recent National Encyclopedia includes the term "hen," a
gender-neutral pronoun that can be used by people who do not fall within the gender bina-
ry of man or woman. See Nina Bahadur, Swedish Gender-Neutral Pronoun, 'Hen,' Added to
Country's National Encyclopedia, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/1 1/swedish-gender-neutral-pronoun-hen-national-encyclopedi
adia n_306 3293.html. Some Swedish citizens and politicians are pushing for public insti-
tutions, such as schools, to adopt gender-neutral practices and terminology. Nathalie
Rothschild, Sweden's New Gender-Neutral Pronoun: Hen, SLATE (Apr. 11, 2012, 5:43 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double-x/doublex/20 12/04/hen sweden s.newgender neutr
al-pronoun causes controversy_.html.
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ers believe that this personal decision should be left to the par-
ents, like any other parenting or birthing decision.
Some advocates, rooted in the work of transgender and gender
non-conforming leaders, assert that sex selection, in a country
where sex is commonly misunderstood to be synonymous with
gender, reinforces the gender binary, a social construct that fails
to recognize the wide spectrum of fixed and fluid gender identities
outside of the man/woman binary.124 Some argue that gender se-
lection could be detrimental to children because it impinges on
their freedom to form their own gender identities by assigning a
gender identity that matches their sex at birth, before a child can
self-determine their gender identity.12
The story of model Chrissy Teigen and her husband, singer
John Legend is illustrative. Teigen recently underwent IVF and
chose to implant only female embryos. 2 ' The couple experienced
backlash on social media for "handpicking qualities" that they
want "rather than letting nature take its course. ' In response,
Teigen joked, "I also picked the embryo with a taste for bacon, a
knack for magic, and size 7 feet so she can always find shoes."'28
Experiencing a similar backlash, celebrity couple Kim Kar-
dashian and Kanye West also reportedly used a gender selection
process to have only male embryos implanted during IVF, hoping
to give a brother to their daughter. "9 Family balancing, as in the
case of Kim and Kanye, is often viewed as more ethically accepta-
ble because it does not result in a preference of one gender over
124. See Rajani Bhatia, Constructing Gender from the Inside Out: Sex-Selection Prac-
tices in The United States, in WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY: A READER IN FEMINIST
SCIENCE STUDIES 304 (Mary Wyer et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014).
125. See GENERATIONS AHEAD, TAKING A STAND: TOOLS FOR ACTION ON SEX SELECTION,
https://napawf.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Toolkit-final.pdf (last visited Dec. 16,
2016).
126. Choo, supra note 123.
127. Mark Grey, Chrissy Teigen Goes on Twitter Defense After Gender Selection Reveal,
MSN (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.msn.com/en-us/entertainment/celebrity/chrissy-teigen-
goes-on-twitter-defense-after-gender-selection-reveal/ar-BBpWYys; see also Choo, supra
note 123 (explaining how the couple "faced a Twitter backlash over [their] desire to have a
girl"); Chrissy Teigen Comes Under Backlash After Revealing Gender Selection,
HEALTHYWOOD HILLS (Feb. 25, 2016), http://healthywoodhills.comlhealth/chrissy-teigen-
comes-under-backlash-after-revealing-gender-selection/ (explaining that Teigen is "getting
burned" after revealing she chose the gender of her baby, and that "her decision wasn't
received too well").
128. Grey, supra note 127.
129. Rachael Rettner, Is it Ethical to Choose a Baby's Sex? Kim and Kanye Fuel Debate,
LIVE SC. (June 24, 2015, 4:49 PM), http://www.livescience.com/51336-kardashian-west-
baby-sex-selection.html.
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the other.13° However, even with family balancing, there are still
concerns that the practice might "represent a 'slippery slope' to-
ward choosing other traits in children, like their eye color, height
or intelligence. '
The slippery slope argument assumes that sex selection and
trait selection are impermissible because of potential outcomes,
either perniciously skewing the population toward homogeneity
or reinforcing and effectuating social prejudices. These outcomes
are conceptually distinct, but largely the same phenomenon. Crit-
ics point to the sex imbalances in China and India as evidence of
the likely result of gender selection and extrapolate that trait se-
lection will also lead to a homogeneity unworthy of the variety
and richness of human life while doubly prejudicing those who
fall in the out-group.132 But such speculative outcomes do not jus-
tify state intervention without the articulation of an identifiable
harm to identifiable persons,133 especially since intervention re-
stricts the moral principle of reproductive autonomy. It is a fun-
damental principle of political liberalism that the state must sus-
tain the conditions for actualizing the widest feasible array of
conceptions of the good life, ways of being in the world, and life
projects that do not harm others.' If the potential harm is merely
speculative, interference is not warranted, especially where there
is a strong countervailing policy that furthers the good life.
Assuming limitations to the absolute principle that extremism
in defense of reproductive liberty is no vice, reasonable compro-
mise short of prohibition is available. Nita Farahany, a member
of President Obama's Commission for the Study of Bio-Ethical Is-
sues, frames the goal in a debate this way: "a middle ground of
prudent vigilance, public oversight and debate about genetic en-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Robert Sparrow, A Not-So-New Eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on Human
Enhancement, 41 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 32-42 (2011) (arguing that the use of genetic tech-
niques by parents to "enhance" their children is not meaningfully different from past use
of eugenics).
133. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1987) ("The only part
of the conduct of anyone for which [one] is amenable to society is that which concerns oth-
ers. In the part which merely concerns [oneself], [one's] independence is, of right, absolute.
Over [oneself], over [one's] own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.");
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN, art. IV (1789) ("Liberty consists
in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else.").
134. MILL, supra note 133, at 9; DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE
CITIZEN, supra note 133.
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gineering is better than prohibition.""'1 Making gender selection
available only for family balancing purposes is one compromise,
eliminating any potential sex imbalance due to the aggregative of
individual preferences for boys or girls. However, this compro-
mise arguably restricts the paramount value of reproductive au-
tonomy arbitrarily. Parents may have permissible motives in se-
lecting gender. Parental motives, however, seem to be of question-
able legal significance.
The social conditions of modern pluralist America can be dis-
tinguished empirically from homogenous China and India.136 In
the United States, there is no deeply rooted preference for male
babies.'37 In fact, if anything, there is a preference for females."8
In a world where an additional estimated 100 million female hu-
man beings are not alive today due to sex discrimination in Chi-
na, India, and elsewhere,"9 a slight preference for female babies
in pluralist America is far from a moral calamity.
2. Race Selection
In addition to gender selection, parents and intermediaries in-
volved in making a baby through ART can also preference race in
order to match parents to same-race gamete donors. Intended
parents can often use the market to make a child resemble the
non-biologically related family as closely as possible,'4' which can
be beneficial, but may also be viewed as perpetuating racial hier-
archies.
Most sperm banks operating in the United States provide in-
formation regarding donor skin color and some even organize do-
nor catalogues by race. 4 ' An unregulated market creates competi-
135. Intelligence Squared U.S., Prohibit Genetically Engineered Babies Full Debate,
YoUTUBE (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-fEn7XOr34Zo.
136. DENA S. DAVIS, GENETIC DILEMMAS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, PARENTAL
CHOICES, AND CHILDREN'S FUTURES 133 (2d ed. 2010).
137. Gender Preference in the United States, INGENDER, http://www.ingender.com/xyu/
gender-preference/#SexSelection (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
138. Id.
139. Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(Dec. 20, 1990), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/12/20/more-than-100-million-women
-are-missing/.
140. Debora L. Spar, As You Like It: Exploring the Limits of Parental Choice in Assisted
Reproduction, 27 L. & INEQ. 481, 485 (2009).
141. Dov Fox, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE L.J. 1844, 1846
(2009).
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tive prices according to such donor characteristics. Simple supply
and demand allows for pricing in which people will pay a premi-
um to have kids that share their racial heritage. Since ART is
primarily used by white people,'42 the result is that white genetic
material generally commands a higher market value than African
American gametes.'43 This can lead to the commodification of ge-
netic material and the children it produces.
Indeed, reproduction has been racialized in many ways for cen-
turies. During slavery, white slave owners often forced their
slaves to have children, used fertility as a factor when considering
the purchase of slaves, and promoted sex for reproductive purpos-
es among their slaves, including providing incentives for slaves
that bore more than six children.44 Further, the United States al-
so has a long history of sterilizing women of color to control and
limit their reproduction.' Today, the racialization of reproduc-
tion can be seen in the surrogacy market. Surrogacy is mostly
used for the benefit of white intended parents. When white in-
tended parents choose to have white children via ART, they are
implicitly acknowledging that our society places a supreme value
on whiteness. There is a presumption that a white child will be
safer, healthier, more educated, less incarcerated, and more eco-
nomically stable than a child of color-all the gaps that studies
have found to exist between white and black children.
46
142. Dov Fox, Race Sorting in Family Formation, 49 FAM. L. Q. 55, 56 (2015).
143. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 269-72 (1997). Cf. Josb Gabilondo, Heterosexuality as a Prenatal So-
cial Problem: Why Parents and Courts Have a Taste for Heterosexuality, in BABY MARKETS:
MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES 118, 121 (Michele Bratcher Good-
win ed., 2010) (discussing how straight children may increase the social status of parents,
thus making them more valuable to some, while gay children may have the opposite ef-
fect).
144. MANNING MARABLE, HOW CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA:
PROBLEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 63-64 (1983).
145. See JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 65-76 (2003); see also Alexandra Minna Stern, Sterilized in the Name of Pub-
lic Health: Race, Immigration, and Reproductive Control in Modern California, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1128, 1128-38 (2005) (exploring the intersections of race, sex, immigration,
sterilization, and health policy by tracing the chronology and context of involuntary steri-
lization in modern California).
146. See generally Lindsey Cook, U.S. Education: Still Separate and Unequal, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-
mine/2015/O1/28/us-education-still-separate-and-unequal (discussing the gaps in education
between black and white kids); STATE OF OBESITY, OBESITY PREVENTION IN BLACK
COMMUNITIES (2014), http://stateofobesity.org/disparities/blacks/ (discussing racial and
ethnic disparities in obesity); George Gao, Chart of the Week: The Black-White Gap, in In-
carceration Rates, PEW RES. CTR. (July 18, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank
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The reality, however, is that, without the use of reproductive
technology, people are free to choose their sexual partners (and
potential co-parents) based on race-a right grounded in individ-
ual freedoms. There is no reason the same should not be true of
potential parents using reproductive technology.
The evidence suggests that over the last millennia, reproduc-
tion has become increasingly less arbitrary. Broadly, five stages
are distinguishable that likely correspond to increasing cognitive
complexity. First, mammals met each other and had an arbitrary
sexual encounter (arbitrary in the sense that they did not plan or
foresee having an encounter at that place with that particular
mammal). Second, humans in hunter-gathering societies had
sexual encounters, the evidence suggests, with many partners in
their small cooperative group. Third, after agriculture, humans
reproduced with members of the same class or status. Fourth,
humans reproduce for the sake of romantic love and planning a
future. And fifth, we have ART and reproductive autonomy in
gender and trait selection. In each case, reproduction becomes
less arbitrary and more planned.
As a mature nation, we look back with regret at miscegenation
statutes and legislative restrictions on homosexual relationships.
We have learned that intrusions into one's private sexual and re-
productive life are particularly damaging to both the individuals
at stake and societal relations. It follows that such intuition
works in favor of a laissez-fair approach to the use of PGD.
Women already choose what to eat when pregnant, what to
avoid, what to listen to, and how to exercise. In choosing a mate
based on beauty, hips, breast, jaw, and height, humans reduce
the arbitrariness in selection and substitute free choice. Choosing
a mate based on race is no different. The technology available
simply takes reproductive choice one step further. The goal is to
reduce uncertainty and risk and bring prudent consideration of
available options to family planning. Status quo bias 147 is likely
what prevents many people from seeing ART as part of the same
continuum.
/2014/07/18/chart-of-the-week-the-black-white-gap-in-incarceration-rates/ (discussing the
gap in incarceration rates between blacks and whites).
147. See generally Scott Eidelman & Christian S. Crandall, Bias in Favor of the Status
Quo, 6 Soc. AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 270, 270-81 (2012) (discussing the rea-
sons for status quo bias).
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3. General Trait Selection and Eugenics
In addition to gender and race selection, genetic screening for
other traits is also becoming more readily available. Today PGD
can be used to select cosmetic traits such as eye and hair color,
complexion, and height, and will eventually enable the selection
of traits such as athletic ability and intelligence.14 s Embryo
screening for such cosmetic criteria that are less medically im-
portant has created its own controversy.
As with surrogacy, critics point to commodification issues and
lack of equal access to the technology as problems with trait se-
lection. Some say that it is unethical to bioengineer children be-
cause the process of genetic enhancement, which might ultimate-
ly allow parents to produce physically and intellectually superior
children, is expensive, and therefore, available only to parents
with substantial means. 49 Such unequal access would only "[wid-
en] societal divisions.' 5 °
However, other advocates point to the fact that as parents, we
already work to make our children as physically fit and intelli-
gent as possible. For example, parents use "tutors, music lessons
or [instill] discipline."'' As one expert explained, "I don't think
there's anything wrong with the attempt to make our children
smarter or kinder .... If we did think that was wrong, we should
give up parenting, and put them out on the street."'52 As with all
ART, inequality itself is the culprit and should be addressed on
its own-universal healthcare or changes in insurance require-
ments could resolve the access issues without compromising
women's reproductive autonomy.
Taken to its extreme, the fear associated with trait selection
extends to concerns about eugenics. Eugenics is defined as the
science of improving a human population by controlled breeding
to increase the occurrence of desirable heritable characteristics.
148. Gautam Naik, 'Designer Babies:'Patented Process Could Lead to Selection of Genes
for Specific Traits, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2013, 7:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10
001424052702303492504579113293429460678.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Tia Ghose, Children to Order: The Ethics of 'Designer Babies,' LIvESCIENCE (Mar.
13, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.livescience.com/44087-designer-babies-ethics.html.
152. Id. (quoting Bonnie Steinbock, philosopher at the University of Albany, State Uni-
versity of New York).
153. Eugenics, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (2d
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The radical, far-reaching consequences of self-selection and selec-
tive breeding-when users of donated genetic material select
gametes on the basis of race and when intended parents are per-
mitted to choose the specific traits of a potential baby, including
cosmetic traits-may involve racial extermination and other
forms of genocide. Indeed, the Holocaust was an example of an at-
tempt at radical eugenics."' A more recent example is the pattern
of state-sanctioned sterilization of Black and Latina women."'
Of course, individual reproductive choices should not be pro-
tected when it leads to the elimination or extreme reduction of
populations, whether overtly intentional or not. Issues relating to
the scientific engineering of a population are disturbing and war-
rant government legislation. Indeed, doctors already have profes-
sional and ethical obligations that may protect against larger,
broad-scale concerns. 56 However, as this part will show, the prac-
tice of trait selection is not likely to lead to scientific engineering
of the population.
Defending the moral permissibility of trait selection by parents
voluntarily making use of PGD against these and adjacent criti-
cisms, it is helpful to articulate a normative framework for what
is often called "liberal eugenics" (compatible with political liberal-
ism) as opposed to "authoritative eugenics" (a tool of political au-
thoritarianism).'57 The experience of the twentieth century preju-
dices the historically conscious with a sea of negative connota-
tions. The Nazis carefully studied and learned from American lib-
eral notions of propaganda and eugenics, and used the principles
of each toward their own ends, resulting in a conflation of the
two."8 Eugenics became associated with the authoritarian eugen-
ics of Nazi Germany, compelling American institutions after the
war to change their names, and giving critics of "benign eugenics"
College ed. 1980) (defining eugenics as "the movement devoted to improving the human
species through the control of hereditary factors in mating").
154. See Daniel J. Kevles, Eugenics and Human Rights, 349 BMJ 435, 435 (1999).
155. See Kathryn Krase, History of Forced Sterilization and Current U.S. Abuses, OUR
BODIES OURSELVES (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/health-info/forced-st
erilization!.
156. See, e.g., AMA Code of Medical Ethics, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.
page (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
157. Sara Goering, Eugenics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (July 2, 2014), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/eugenics/.
158. Id.
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further ammunition to be skeptical of the practice in the United
States.159
However, it can be argued that both propaganda and eugenics
are neutral tools; ethical and moral concerns arise only in re-
sponse to the way in which the tools are used. For example, a box-
ing coach is unjustifiably held accountable if, unbeknownst to
him, his student goes out and needlessly punches people in the
face. Boxing can be used for exercise and sport, defense, or gratui-
tous violence. In itself, it is neutral. Propaganda has the same
neutral status.
160
So how can the normative framework of liberal eugenics be dis-
tinguished from that of authoritarian eugenics? A "normative"
framework can be understood as the conceptual limitations and
elements of an institutional practice.'61 Four normative elements
of liberal eugenics distinguish the practice from authoritarian eu-
genics and support the permissibility of sex and trait selection
through ART against the common critiques: (1) private purposes;
(2) individual freedom (reproductive autonomy); (3) value plural-
ism; and (4) enlightened scientific reasoning. 161
First, liberal eugenics is based on private choices for private
purposes, whereas authoritarian eugenics is based on centralized
choices for the state's purposes, whether that be the glory of a na-
tion or the dominance of a particular race."' Therefore, the prac-
tice of liberal eugenics is voluntary and individuals are neither
coerced to select genes nor legally prohibited from doing so.6 The
reason most of us understand that Nazi-style, authoritarian eu-
genics is immoral is because it is coercive and disregards the wel-
fare of individual stakeholders. On the other hand, liberal eugen-
ics respects free choice and remains neutral with regard to the
purposes of individual stakeholders.
159. Id. For example, once the concept of "eugenics" soured after World War II, the
American Eugenics Society became the Society for the Study of Social Biology. Id. The
negative connotations associated with "eugenics" persist.
160. See Charles L. Griswold, Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry, THE STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112016/entries/plato-rhetoric/.
161. For example, normative models of democracy list various elements, including free
speech, equal voting rights, and a separation of church and state, as conditions for democ-
racy to be more than mere majority rule. Jirgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of
Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 2 (1994).
162. Goering, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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Second, liberal eugenics is premised on the traditional Ameri-
can value of individual liberty, whereas authoritarian eugenics is
premised on the ontological and moral priority of the state or so-
cial organism. 6 ' Parents are able to select genes based on their
own values and conceptions of what is good for them and their
children. Prohibiting ART-related genetic selection is an intru-
sion into the private lives of individuals, particularly their repro-
ductive autonomy, precisely what critics of Nazi-style authoritar-
ian eugenics see as most problematic.
Third, given the variety of genetic choices available to potential
parents and the variety of potential parents in the given society
in which we find ourselves, fears of homogeneity, or the exacerba-
tion and effectuation of social prejudices, are insufficient worries
to trump the paramount value of reproductive autonomy.' The
practice of liberal eugenics in modern America will be embedded
in a cultural milieu that presumes, respects, and practices value
pluralism, whereas authoritarian eugenics starts from the oppo-
site position, valuing one type of human being, one set of values,
and one conception of the good life."6 7
Not only does political liberalism see the state as neutral with
regard to "the good life" and what people value, but, as a socio-
historical fact, the United States is so large, complex, and diverse
that empirically there can be no consensus on these matters. 16 It
may be inferred that parents will desire different and varied
traits for their children, or abstain from ART altogether, belying
concerns for a race to blond, blue-eyed boys, a fear almost incom-
prehensible if not for the Nazis. In fact, in a pluralistic, open, and
liberal society such as ours, we should expect parents to choose
traits that many of us find counterintuitive because human be-
ings are animals with feelings, not rational wealth-maximizers.
There is some evidence that for many people, the "best" child is
the child most like his or her parents,161 or most like the best ver-
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. This can be presumed by looking at the numbers of people who choose to have a
biological child through IVF over adoption, presumably wanting to pass down their own
genes. One can also look at how donor sperm and egg selections are made. DNA, which
generally provides information about health and ancestry, is often employed to match the
genetic profile of a would-be parent to that of donor sperm or eggs. How to Choose a Sperm
Donor, CONCEPT FERTILITY CLINIC (July 23, 2014, 8:25 AM), http://www.conceptfertility.
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sion of his or her parents. Thus, we can reasonably expect the va-
riety of rich human characters and experiences that critics of lib-
eral eugenics fear will be lost. Further, we can reasonably expect
many parents to reject the notion that more physical and intellec-
tual capacity is always a good thing. In fact, those values are of-
ten incompatible-chase one value and we lose the other. 7 '
Fourth, the practice of liberal eugenics in modern America will
be conducted by parents informed by genetic counselors who are
themselves informed by enlightened scientific reasoning, whereas
authoritarian eugenics of the twentieth century, in both the Unit-
ed States and Germany, mistakenly identified social and institu-
tional plights as genetic. 171 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
the author of the Buck v. Bell decision,7 2 articulated the errone-
ous assumptions of the day, that immorality, prostitution, crime,
and promiscuity are genetic rather than institutional, and held
that compulsory sterilization statutes do not violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 We now have a bet-
ter grasp of the interaction between genetic content, social insti-
tutions, and the environment generally.
174
As a compromise, using PGD for medical treatment or genetic
disease elimination, as opposed to "genetic enhancement" purpos-
es, may appear more ethically permissible to those skeptical of
the consequences of meddling with the human genome, so-called
"God-playing." However, this compromise again arbitrarily re-
stricts reproductive autonomy.
In sum, the starting point is political liberalism, whereby the
state remains neutral with regard to values, as opposed to classi-
cal republicanism whereby the state encourages virtuous citizens
co.uk/2014/07/23/how-to-choose-a-sperm-donor/. In addition, anecdotal evidence supports
the idea that parents often seek to have children who are like themselves. See, e.g., Barba-
ra Stewart, Tough Choices: In Vitro vs. Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1995), at CY1 (inter-
viewing infertile parents who want nothing more than to have a biological baby, explain-
ing: 'Their dreams are not of just any child. They want a child or children of their flesh, a
child with the father's chin and the mother's knack for mental arithmetic.").
170. See Erik Parens, Is Better Always Good?, HASTINGS CTR. REP. (1998), at S1 (dis-
cussing the various concerns of human enhancement); Isiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liber-
ty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 119, 169-70 (1970) (explaining that humans choose be-
tween ultimate values).
171. Goering, supra note 157.
172. 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
173. Id. at 207.
174. MICHAEL RUTTER, GENES AND BEHAVIOR: NATURE-NURTURE INTERPLAY
EXPLAINED 178 (2006).
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with particular desired dispositions.17 It follows that the burden
is on the state to articulate an identifiable harm to identifiable
persons in its justification for prohibiting the conduct of private
parties, not on the private parties to articulate why their conduct
is morally permissible. Moreover, because the value at stake here,
reproductive autonomy, is paramount, the state's burden is high,
requiring more than speculation about potential societal conse-
quences. Finally, the intrusion into reproductive autonomy by
twentieth-century authoritarian eugenics is precisely what socie-
ty aims to avoid, increasing our skepticism of the state's justifica-
tions that rest on societal consequential moral reasoning.
With a normative framework that distinguishes liberal eugen-
ics from authoritative eugenics, and with reproductive autonomy
as the overriding concern, the fear of potential discrimination is
not dismissed but overridden by autonomy considerations. The
fact of pluralism with respect to desirable traits and gender, as
well as the myth of perfection, will together check for imbalances
and homogeneity, and will assure a variety of rich human charac-
ters and dispositions, skills, and interests.
C. Creation, Freezing, and Destruction of Excess Embryos
Much of the public debate and discourse about ART has been
dominated by abortion politics, which has centralized the discus-
sion on the moral status of the embryo.176 Nowhere is that debate
more prevalent than with the creation, use, storage, and destruc-
tion of excess IVF embryos. The IVF process involves an invasive
and expensive extraction of eggs. " To prevent the possibility of
having to repeat this process and to improve chances of success,
doctors extract and fertilize as many eggs as possible, implant the
healthiest one, and leave the patient to decide what to do with the
remaining embryos.7 8 Patients may choose to freeze the remain-
ing embryos for potential future use, donate them for reproduc-
tive purposes, donate them to scientific research, or dispose of
175. See, e.g., Gary C. Leedes, Liberalism, Republicanism and the Abortion Controver-
sy, 35 VILL. L. REV. 571, 571-72, 584 (1990).
176. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1015, 1015-16 (2010).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1016.
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them.17 Contracting in these areas has been controversial be-
cause of an embryo's potential for life.
The moral status of the embryo is defined differently depending
on one's cultural, religious, political, and philosophical perspec-
tives. On one end of the vast spectrum of views influencing the
moral status of the embryo is what some scholars have termed
"embryo fundamentalism." ' Much like "pro-life," anti-abortion
advocates, embryo fundamentalists believe that embryos are
"unique human beings from the moment of conception, and
should be respected as such."18' They equate the destruction of
embryos with the destruction of human lives,18' and "believe with
all their fibers that these are their frozen children."'' On the oth-
er end of the spectrum are those who view embryos as "just an-
other type of bodily tissue, nothing but a clump of cells," with no
moral status whatsoever.84 In between lies a wide range of per-
spectives that assigns some moral status to an embryo because of
its potential to create human life, but does not view the embryo
as having a moral status such that its destruction is a violation of
human life. 88
Even for those who assign no moral status to an embryo, the
decision of what to do with remaining embryos can still be a diffi-
cult one to make. Some patients who do not wish to use the re-
maining embryos, or for whom the costs of freezing embryos is
prohibitively expensive, will choose to donate the embryos to oth-
er patients seeking to use IVF."8 ' Other patients, however, are un-
comfortable with their genetic material being used to conceive a
child for another person.'87 Some patients simply wish to avoid
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1017; see also Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo:
Implications for Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 303, 305-06 (2006).
183. Wes Judd, The Messy, Complicated Nature of Assisted Reproductive Technology,
PAC. STANDARD (Sept. 28, 2015), https://psmag.com/the-messy-complicated-nature-of-ass
isted-reproductive-technology-349d0c55a874#.ywtzbneo7 (quoting Susan Crockin, Massa-
chusetts-based lawyer).
184. Katz, supra note 182, at 306.
185. See id.
186. See Laura Beil, What Happens to Extra Embryos after IVF?, CNN.COM (Sept. 1,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/extra.ivf.embryos/index.html?iref-24hou
rs.
187. Id.
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the legal process of donating an embryo to another patient.188
Many people, both those who view an embryo as having some sort
of human moral status and those who view embryos as lacking
any moral status, choose to donate remaining embryos to science,
in the hopes of using their genetic material to advance human life
by developing treatments or cures for fatal diseases.18 9
Many patients choose cryopreservation, the process of freezing
bodily material so that it can be used in the future.8 ' Cryopreser-
vation deals with the freezing of sperm, eggs, or embryos.81 While
sperm cryopreservation has long been an accepted method for
preserving the fertility potential of many young men, egg cryo-
preservation has proven more difficult medically, and has gener-
ated more controversy.
192
As with surrogacy and the use of PGD, the criticism deals with
the sanctity of reproduction-a woman who harvests her eggs for
the future because she currently does not want to have children
disrespects the "sacredness" of "natural" motherhood. Embryo
freezing allows a potential mother to put off motherhood in a way
that does not reaffirm the priority of motherhood over career and
all else. News sources have often shown scorn for the woman who
utilizes reproductive technology to make pregnancy available to
her in the future, when she is ready, using, for example, deroga-
tory terms such as "geriatric mother" or "post-menopausal moth-
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 176, at 1016; Egg Cryopreservation (Freezing Your
Eggs), SEATTLE CHILD. HOSP., http://www.seattlechildrens.org/pdf/PE1372.pdf (last visited
Dec. 16, 2016).
191. Egg Cryopreservation (Freezing Your Eggs), SEATTLE CHILD. HOSP., http://www.
seattlechildrens.org/pdf/PE1372.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
192. For a social history of the rise and acceptance of sperm banking and artificial in-
semination through the twentieth century, see CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, EXPOSING MEN: THE
SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF MALE REPRODUCTION 75-85 (2006). The controversy surround-
ing the usefulness and impact of egg cryopreservation-as well as outstanding questions of
its medical viability-is discussed in Lucia Martinelli et al., Social Egg Freezing. A Repro-
ductive Change or Smoke and Mirrors?, 56 CROATIAN MED. J. 387, 390 (2015), http://www.
cmj.hr/2015/56/4/26321034.htm (questioning whether social egg freezing improves wom-
en's reproductive choices and lives, or if it actually just helps preserve longstanding norms
and views surrounding women's bodies and role in society), and Rene Almeling et al., Egg-
Freezing a Better Deal for Companies Than for Women, CNN (Oct. 20, 2014, 4:11 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/20/opinionlalmeling-radin-richardson-egg-freezing/ (arguing
that social egg freezing is not the solution to appeasing demanding work schedules and
career goals of women, instead that social policies providing better work-life balance would
be more effective).
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er."'93 Such modern reproductive desires uncover the stigma of
women exploiting reproductive technology for their own selfish
purposes.' This so-called selfish woman does not fit within the
mold of the normal, good mother who has the instinctual desire
and the biological urge to have children.
Ironically, women who put off childbirth because of their
unique life circumstances, whether it be based on career and the
desire to attain financial security before starting a family, illness,
or simply because they are waiting to find the right partner, often
do so for the most unselfish reasons. The woman's reasons are
unselfish because her concern with flourishing motherhood can-
not be divorced either conceptually or pragmatically from her
concern for flourishing childhood:
Older mums tend to be better educated, more financially stable, con-
fident and settled in themselves. They have the emotional maturity
and life experience that translates well to motherhood. They are
more likely to breast feed and breast feed for longer which helps pro-
tect against post natal depression.
195
It follows that the relevant evaluative standard for motherhood
ought to be focused on the emotional, social, and intellectual con-
ditions she provides for the child's growth rather than the means
by which the woman becomes a mother. Given her particular cir-
cumstances, if a woman believes that freezing her embryos is the
best way to bring about such future flourishing, respecting the
dignity of motherhood does not warrant interference.
Complications arise when couples disagree on the disposition of
unused embryos. In a majority of cases, contracts entered into at
the time of IVF are enforceable as long as they do not violate pub-
193. See, e.g., Rachael Wheeler, Kim Kardashian Reveals Plans to Freeze Her Eggs (She
Could Just Try, You Know, Doing it' with Kanye West?), MIRROR (Sept. 10, 2012), http:
//www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/kim-kardashian-reveals-plans-to-freeze- 1317066
(mocking Kim Kardashian for her desire to freeze her eggs "because she doesn't want to be
too old before she has kids" and joking that "[t]hey could try the good old fashioned way
first"). But see Welcome to Older Mum, OLDER Mum: A SUPPORTIVE RESOURCE FOR
MOTHERS OVER 35, http://www.oldermum.co.uk (last visited Dec. 16, 2016) (aiming to chal-
lenge "outdated" labels such as geriatric mother, and arguing that having children later in
life is completely normal, healthy, and may even be possible post-menopause).
194. See, e.g., Kate Connolly Berlin, 65-Year-Old German Woman Expecting Quadru-
plets Defends Pregnancy, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2015, 6:33 AM), https://www.theguardi
an.com/world/2015/apr/14/65-year-old-german-woman-expecting-quadruplets-defends-preg
nancy.
195. OLDER MUM, supra note 193.
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lic policy.19 For example, in a recent case, a California court up-
held a contract that mandated a couple's frozen embryos be de-
stroyed in the event of divorce.'97 Shortly before their wedding,
the woman discovered she had breast cancer, and together the
couple decided to undertake IVF to preserve her fertility.99 While
married, the couple signed a contract with the fertility clinic
agreeing that the embryos would be destroyed if they ever di-
vorced.'99 During their divorce, however, the wife changed her
mind and argued that her constitutional right to procreate should
transcend their agreement.' The court rejected this argument
and upheld the contract, ruling that the embryos should be de-
stroyed. The court reasoned:
Decisions about family and children often are difficult, and can be
wrenching when they become disputes. The policy best suited to en-
suring that these disputes are resolved in a clear-eyed manner-
unswayed by the turmoil, emotion, and accusations that attend to
196. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Ro-
man v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.
1998). In each of these three cases, the couple signed a consent form where they agreed
that in the event of death or divorce, any cryopreserved embryos would be destroyed or
donated to research. Dahl, 194 P.3d at 836; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 42; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at
176-77. All three courts held that such an agreement was enforceable and did not violate
public policy. Dahl, 834 P.3d at 841-42; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 49-50, 54-55; Kass, 696
N.E.2d at 180-81; see also Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002), amended sub
nom. 53 P.3d 516 (enforcing a contract which prohibited further development of the em-
bryos). See generally Marina Merjan, Comment, Rethinking the "Force" Behind "Forced
Procreation" The Case for Giving Women Exclusive Decisional Authority Over Their Cryo-
preserved Pre-Embryos, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 737 (2015) (asserting that while contracts are
effective at resolving disposition issues, a simpler and better framework would be to grant
exclusive authority to women to make such decisions); Ceala E. Breen-Portnoy, Comment,
Frozen Embryo Disposition in Cases of Separation and Divorce: How Nahmani v. Nahmani
and Davis v. Davis Form the Foundation for a Workable Expansion of Current Interna-
tional Family Planning Regimes, 28 MD. J. INT'L L. 275 (2013) (suggesting that embryo
disposition agreements should be standardized and given a presumption of validity);
Marisa G. Zizzi, Comment, The Preembryo Prenup: A Proposed Pennsylvania Statute
Adopting a Contractual Approach to Resolving Disputes Concerning the Disposition of Fro-
zen Embryos, 21 WIDENER L.J. 391 (2012) (proposing a statute requiring use of a contrac-
tual framework to resolve disposition issues as a proactive approach to limit litigation).
197. Findley v. Lee, No. FDI13780539, 2015 WL 7295217, at *44 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov.
18, 2015). This case was immediately reported by major media outlets. See Andy Newman,
California Judge Orders Frozen Embryos Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/california-judge-orders-frozen-embryos-destroyed.html;
Justin William Moyer, Calif. Judge Rejects Woman's Plea to Save Frozen Embryos from
Destruction, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/11/19/calif-court-rules-against-divorced-cancer-survivor-in-dispute-over-froz
en-embryos-even-though-she-may-be-infertile/.
198. Findley, 2015 WL 7295217, at *4-5.
199. Id. at*6-7, *10-11.
200. Id. at *35.
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contested proceedings in family court-is to give effect to the inten-
tions of the parties at the time of the decision at issue.20 '
The wife was in essence arguing that the opportunity to become a
mother was so sacred that it should transcend their prior agree-
ment. The court, however, gave effect to their contract as the on-
ly legitimate way to resolve the reproduction issues between the
parties.2 2
Even in the absence of an express agreement, courts tend to de-
fer to the intent of the parties at the time of creating and storing
the embryos, considering, among other things, the lengths to
which the parties went to preserve the embryos as evidence of in-
tent. In Reber v. Reiss, for example, there was no express con-
tract, and therefore, the court balanced the wife's interest in ge-
netic parenthood against her husband's interest in avoiding
unwanted procreation.0 The court placed a great deal of weight
on the fact that, due to the wife's advancing age and the extensive
cancer treatment, the embryos likely represented her last chance
at genetic parenthood.0 4 In that case, the couple underwent IVF
in response to the news of the wife's cancer diagnosis, delaying
her cancer treatment by several weeks to pursue IVF, as a way to
preserve her capacity for genetic parenthood.20 ' The court viewed
this as the husband's implicit agreement to procreate with the
wife if her fertility was jeopardized as a result of the cancer
treatment.2 6 While there was no written contract, the court re-
solved the issue by balancing two compelling equal rights.2 7
201. Id. at *2.
202. Id.
203. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1136 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
204. Id. at 1138-40.
205. Id. at 1132.
206. Id. at 1140.
207. On the other hand, in Davis v. Davis, the court held that the interest of the wife in
donating the frozen embryos to another couple was outweighed by the interest of the hus-
band in not procreating. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992). The court
explained: "Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming
that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other
than use of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the
argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.
However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely to donate them to
another couple, the objecting party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail."
Id. at 604. Other courts have held that absent express agreement, when the creators of the
frozen embryos are not able to reach an agreement as to the disposition of their frozen
embryos, the most suitable solution is to leave them where they are-in cryopreservation
storage. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa 2003) (requiring
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As with surrogacy contracts, some people may take issue with
enforcing these contracts, not because of any public policy sur-
rounding the use of embryos, but rather, because of the difficulty
of judicially determining the actual intent of the parties, and the
possibility of exploitation and induced manifestations of assent."'
The problem here might not be with enforcing the agreement of
the parties as a general matter as much as determining whether
each individual agreement was entered into with full consent. As
discussed under surrogacy, there are already contract doctrines
in place to deal with this, such as undue influence and uncon-
scionability"'
Commonly, parties sign clinic consent forms that specify what
they would like to have happen with the embryos if one or both
parties die, or if they divorce.210 However, cryopreservation com-
panies often impose terms without ensuring that parties truly
understood all their options. Most clinic consent forms contain
language to the effect that in the event of death or divorce, the
parties agree to have the embryos either donated to a third party,
donated to research, or destroyed.211 However, parties may not
carefully consider a fourth option-that the embryos be trans-
ferred to the exclusive control of one of the parties.112 While par-
ties generally give careful consideration to the overall issue of ex-
cess embryos, they may quickly dismiss the option of allowing one
of the potential parents to use the embryos in the case of divorce.
Too many times, parties cannot imagine circumstances they
might later find themselves in-divorced and possibly unable to
have genetic children. Before signing advanced directives regard-
contemporaneous mutual consent of both parties and holding that there was not to be any
use or disposition of the couple's frozen embryos unless the couple reached an agreement).
208. Cf., e.g., Merjan, supra note 196, at 768 (concluding that sole authority for disposi-
tion of embryos should rest with the woman, to simplify the legal ramifications and re-
main consistent with the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence). But cf-, e.g., Zizzi, su-
pra note 196, at 418 (proposing a statute that would emphasize a contractual approach as
the best expression of "the parties' intentions regarding the disposition of their preembry-
os").
209. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
210. See Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Fertility Patients' Views About Frozen Embryo
Disposition: Results of a Multi-Institutional U.S. Survey, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 499,
506 (2010).
211. See Catherine Tucker, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from the Informed Consent
Process in Fertility Treatments, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE, Mar. 2013, at n.15, http://www.a
mericanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba-health-esourcehome/aba-health-law
_esource_1303_tucker.html.
212. See id.
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ing the embryos, parties should be counseled about the possible
alternatives so as to realize true assent. Thus, the problem, for
the most part, lies with assent and lack of counseling rather than
with public policy about contracting in these areas.
These cases are personal to the individuals whose genetic ma-
terial created the embryos, and therefore, there is no right an-
swer for how to use or dispose of the embryos beyond looking at
the intent of the parties. Since this determination must be made,
private agreements between the parties need to be enforceable.
Donors and clinics should be required to execute agreements re-
garding the disposition of donors' frozen embryos before the em-
bryos are created. However, such agreements should not include
standard boilerplate language stating that the parties agree the
embryos will be destroyed if the parties ever divorce. Where the
cryopreservation company in essence imposes a term that calls
for the destruction of frozen embryos, or there is no express term
indicating the intent of the parties either way, then intent must
be discerned from the facts. There is precedent to suggest that
where, for example, a woman is trying to save eggs because of
treatments that will destroy her ability to make eggs, the great
lengths to which the parties go to preserve her eggs is valuable
evidence and should be given primary weight in the determina-
tion of intent.213 Enforcing advanced dispositional agreements
when the parties make informed decisions provides donors with
the greatest amount of procreative liberty, and ensures that indi-
viduals participating in IVF fully understand and consider the
consequences of their actions.
Unique issues regarding cryopreservation arise after one, or
both, of the parties passes away. The advent of successful tech-
niques of spermatozoon and embryo cryopreservation makes the
birth of a child whose genetic father or mother is dead technically
possible.214 Posthumous reproduction, which has received growing
attention in recent years, is highly controversial, raising some
unique questions again about the scope of reproductive freedom
and the limits of consent.215
213. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1151, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Reber
v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1138-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
214. See G. Bahadur, Death and Conception, 17 HUMAN REPROD. 2769, 2770, 2773
(2002).
215. See, e.g., Maya Sabatello, Posthumously Conceived Children: An International and
Human Rights Perspective, 27 CLEVE.-MARSHALL J.L. & HEALTH 29, 29 (2014).
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The uses of this technology can vary. While the most common
posthumous reproduction involves the partner of a deceased man
herself using his frozen gametes to fertilize her own egg, there
are a variety of other scenarios that can pose new questions about
consent.21 For instance, a husband can have the frozen embryos
of his deceased wife implanted into a surrogate, or he could re-
marry and his new wife could be implanted with the frozen eggs.
The frozen genetic material can be donated or used by parents of
the deceased to produce a grandchild. The deceased might even
request that his or her mother, the grandmother of the child, car-
ry the pregnancy.217 These examples represent new forms of the
nontraditional family, raising complicated questions about famil-
ial relationships and parentage.
Opponents of posthumous reproduction do not believe the fun-
damental right to procreate should extend beyond death. Oppo-
nents may make arguments about the "psychological instability"
of the grieving parent that might "impair the child's future wel-
fare," and that "a resulting child may be a 'substitute' for the lost
spouse.""21 But the arguments are more often based on religious
doctrines. While there is no consensus among the different reli-
gions on posthumous reproduction, Roman Catholics reject it be-
cause it separates human reproduction from sexual intercourse
and calls for the insemination of a single woman.219 Islam also re-
jects this procedure because it takes place after the end of the
marital term.2 ' Judaism, on the contrary, permits posthumous
procreation."'
Many of these religious arguments stem from traditional no-
tions about the sacredness of motherhood-these faiths, informed
by their doctrines, see "natural" reproduction as a hallowed part
of the institutions of marriage and parenthood.222 Justifications
216. Id. at 33-34.
217. Cf. id. at 33 (stating that a surrogate mother can birth the child and that a
grandmother may favor surrogacy to create a grandchild). A recent news story reported
that a grandmother gave birth to her own granddaughter. Amanda Jackson, Grandmother
Gives Birth to Granddaughter, CNN (Jan. 8, 2016, 11:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016
/01/08/health/grandmother-gives-birth-to-granddaughter-texas-irpt/.
218. Sabatello, supra note 215, at 35.
219. See Joseph G. Schenker, Assisted Reproductive Practice: Religious Perspectives,
REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 310, 315 (2005), www.rbmonline.com/Article/1539.
220. See id. at 315-17.
221. Id. at 317.
222. See id. at 313.
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for civil law based on religious doctrine should be a red flag, dis-
tinguished from justifications for civil law based on natural law
and universal human rights, which are recognizably universal
and generally applicable. For the state to restrict sexual autono-
my on the basis of parochial religious teachings goes against the
grain of both the principles of the founding of the United States
and the contemporary progressive morality informed by con-
science over dogma and enlightened society over the past.
Despite these moral concerns, issues involving embryos can
typically be resolved based on the consent of both parents. The
right to reproductive freedom includes the choice of how and
when to procreate and under what circumstances. Parental deci-
sions about the sort of commitment they want to undertake
should accordingly be respected. Though it may disturb some of
us, the decision to delay childbirth, or even to facilitate childbirth
after the passing of one of the biological parents, is not a social
problem that requires regulation. Viewing family as a private in-
stitution leaves such decisions and dilemmas properly to the fam-
ily members.
D. Prenatal Screening: Selective Abortion and Selective Reduction
While advances in prenatal testing and diagnosis have created
previously unimaginable possibilities for childless couples, they
have also given rise to an array of ethical questions about selec-
tive termination. The ethical questions are especially troubling
when they involve contracting.
Prenatal testing allows parents to decide whether to terminate
a pregnancy based on a diagnosed birth defect, regardless of its
severity.223 This raises concerns about normalizing selective abor-
tion of fetuses with minor abnormalities.224 The Institute of Medi-
cine "recommends that prenatal diagnosis not be used for minor
conditions or characteristics," but it becomes contentious to de-
termine what constitutes a minor condition.225 The decision to
terminate a pregnancy based on a prenatal diagnosis varies ac-
cording to differences in cultural and social attitudes toward
223. See Antina de Jong et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: Ethical Issues Explored,
18 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 272, 272-73 (2010).
224. Id. at 272, 274.
225. COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 105 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
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abortion; personal responsibility; stigmatization; children's role in
society; and the significance of class, race, ethnicity, kinship, edu-
cation, and religion.226 Even when the information communicated
is accurate, human emotion and the desire to conceive can greatly
affect judgment when laypersons assess complicated scientific in-
formation in a vacuum. But ultimately, termination of healthy
pregnancies is permitted in this country, and women have the
right to terminate for any reason, as long as it is within the pa-
rameters of the law.2 7
While expectant parents can face agonizing choices about
whether to terminate a pregnancy because of birth defects or un-
dergo selective reduction when carrying multiples, issues can be
even more troubling for parents creating a family through ART.22s
These intended parents must wrestle not only with their own ag-
onizing decisions, but also with the rights and feelings of the
woman carrying their child.2 Issues surrounding termination of
pregnancy carried by a surrogate are complicated when the terms
of the surrogacy agreement surrounding termination come up
against the constitutional right to privacy. When multiple parties
are involved in birthing the child, there are complicated questions
about who should have the right to make the decision about ter-
mination, as well as the way contract law fits with the constitu-
tional right to terminate a pregnancy and the constitutional right
to privacy, if at all. Whose wishes should control where the in-
tended parents want to terminate the pregnancy but the surro-
gate does not, or conversely, where the surrogate wishes to ter-
minate the pregnancy but the intended parents desire to go
through with it?
Many surrogacy contracts include clauses that specify the
rights of the parties regarding pregnancy termination or selective
reduction.2 ' Some contracts may specify that the intended par-
226. See id. at 159-60.
227. ANGELINA BAGLINI, CHARLOTTE LOZIER INST., GESTATIONAL LIMITS ON ABORTION
IN THE UNITED STATES COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS 3 (2014), https://lozierinsti
tute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/American-Reports-Series-Internatnational-Abortion-
Norms.pdf.
228. Deborah L. Forman, Abortion and Selective Reduction Clauses in Surrogacy Con-
tracts: What Every Intended Parent and Surrogate Needs to Know, PATH2PARENTHOOD
(Nov. 24, 2014), www.path2parenthood.orgblog/abortion-and-selective-reduction-clauses-
in-surrogacy-contracts-what-every-intended-parent-and-surrogate-needs-to-know.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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ents can make all termination or reduction decisions, while others
may include more specific clauses, such as a provision that the in-
tended parents may not reduce for gender-selection purposes."'
Some contracts involve selective termination clauses that bind a
surrogate to terminate the pregnancy under certain adverse or
unexpected circumstances.232 The contract may also delineate the
maximum number of embryos that may be transferred.233
Although such clauses are fairly common, it is unclear whether
they are enforceable. Termination clauses are often found to be in
violation of public policy and thus not enforceable. 234 However,
while most courts would not enjoin a woman from having a legal
abortion or compel a surrogate to terminate or selectively reduce
a pregnancy, the issue remains about the effect of the contract
and whether one party is entitled to contract damages when the
235
other party does not follow a selective termination provision.
In one highly publicized California case, the court refused to
compel selective reduction and did not award contract damages to
the intended parents when the surrogate refused to follow the se-
lective reduction provision in the contract. In that case, Helen
Beasley, a surrogate mother from the United Kingdom, agreed to
carry a child for a California couple, Charles Wheeler and Martha
Berman.23 Without the use of an agency, the parties agreed to a
surrogacy contract in which Wheeler and Berman agreed to pay
Beasley $20,000 to carry their child, and Beasley also agreed to
selectively terminate any additional fetuses should IVF produce a
multiple pregnancy.23 In the second month of her pregnancy,
Beasley discovered she was pregnant with twins but subsequent-
ly refused to selectively terminate one of the fetuses, prompting
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Chris Taylor, One Baby Too Many, TIME (Aug. 19, 2001), http://content.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,171789,00.html.
237. Id. Under the surrogacy contract, both parties agreed that any request for a selec-
tive abortion would be made by the twelfth week of Beasley's pregnancy. Beasley claimed
that Wheeler and Berman requested that she abort the unwanted second fetus at the end
of the thirteenth week of pregnancy, and that an abortion in the second trimester would
pose a health risk. Surrogate Sues Couple Who Turned Down Twins, DAILY MAIL, www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-65930/surrogate-sues-couple-turned-twins.html (last visited
Dec. 16, 2016).
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the intended parents to terminate the contract."' Beasley sued
Wheeler and Berman for emotional damages and breach of con-
tract, and later filed a second suit to have their parental rights
revoked after they announced their intention to place both twins
with an adoptive family.239 Despite the fact that California law
recognizes intended parents' parental rights in surrogacy contract
disputes, the court refused to order selective termination.240
In another case, however, the court enforced a surrogacy con-
tract and awarded custody to the intended father, but refused to
enforce a selective termination provision. In that case, after dis-
covering that the surrogate, Melissa Cook, was carrying triplets,
an intended father threatened to sue the surrogate for monetary
damages if she refused to selectively reduce the pregnancy, based
on a provision in their surrogacy contract that allowed him to re-
quest a reduction.241 He sought reduction based on potential
health concerns of the babies and his limited finances for raising
three children, believing he should not have to consent to be the
parent of an unwanted child, even if he did not ultimately raise
it. 2 The surrogate, who was pro-life, sued for custody, as well as
her full surrogacy fee, claiming that the surrogacy contract was
not enforceable and that she was the legal mother of the triplets
(the parties had used an egg from an anonymous egg donor).4
Cook alleged that the father, a fifty-year-old single, deaf postal
worker who lives with his elderly parents, was unfit to care for
238. Surrogate Sues Couple Who Turned Down Twins, DAILY MAIL, www.dailymail.
co.uk/new/article-65930/surrogate-sues-couple-turned-twins.html (last visited Dec. 16,
2016). Beasley claimed she would not have refused selective reduction had arrangements
been made earlier, but that a protracted dispute between the parties delayed matters past
the thirteenth week. Taylor, supra note 236.
239. Surrogate Sues Parents Over Unborn Twins, CNN (Aug. 13, 2001, 12:54 PM),
www.cnn.com/2001/US/08/11/surrogate.twins/.
240. ROSEMARIE SKAINE, PATERNITY AND AMERICAN LAW 112-13 (2003). The twin girls
were ultimately adopted. Enohumah Kingsley Osagie, Surrogacy: Whose Child Is It?, 11 J.
OF MED. & MED. SCI. 505, 508 (2010). The complaint was dismissed, without prejudice, by
all parties, and the record was sealed. Dismissal of Entire Action Without Prejudice,
Beasley v. Wheeler, No. CGC-01-401717 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2002).
241. Carl Campanile, Surrogate Carrying Triplets Sues to Stop Forced Abortion, N.Y.
POST (Jan. 4, 2016, 10:57 PM), www.nypost.com/2016/01/04/surrogate-mom-carrying-trip
lets-sues-to-stop-forced-abortion/.
242. Cook v. Harding, No. 2:16-cv-00742-ODW (AFM), 2016 WL 3190556, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. June 6, 2016).
243. Id. at *6; Katie O'Reilly, When Parents and Surrogates Disagree on Abortion, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/02/surrogacy-
contract-melissa-cook/463323/.
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the children. 44 She sought custody of at least the child who was
targeted for abortion, pointing out that it would be "cruel to the
child" to allow it to be raised by a stranger (the likely result if the
intended father retained custody), when she, the surrogate, wants
the baby.24 On the other hand, the intended father argued that
singling out one of the children for adoption would be cruel and
that reducing would be preferred." 6
The court granted the intended father's petition to terminate
Melissa Cook's legal relationship with the babies and to name
him as the sole parent."7 Shortly thereafter, Cook gave birth to
the triplets. The babies were born premature and remained in the
hospital for seven weeks, until they were released into their fa-
ther's care.4 8 During that time, Cook repeatedly tried to see the
babies and obtain their medical information, but was forbidden
from doing so. The hospital went as far as to install additional se-
curity on the neonatal floor.2"9
Under California law, parental rights are given to the intended
parents, as evidenced by contract. However, the contract must of
course be valid under traditional contract law principles.2 5 0 A
complication in the Beasley case was that the parties did not con-
sult an agency, and so it is likely the surrogate did not receive
proper and thorough counseling and information.25 ' There was no
selective reduction clause in the written contract (there was only
a verbal agreement),5  and the intended parents were both law-
244. Michelle Goldberg, Is a Surrogate a Mother?, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2016, 5:00 PM),
www.slate.com/articles/double-x/doublex/2016/02/custody-case-over-triplets-in california
_raises-questions about surrogacy.html.
245. Campanile, supra note 241.
246. O'Reilly, supra note 243.
247. Brendan Pierson, California Surrogate Loses Bid to be Named Mother of Triplets,
REUTERS, (June 8, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-surrogacy-idUSKC
NOYU2G3.
248. Id.
249. Cook v. Harding, No. 2:16-cv-00742-ODW (AFW), 2016 WL3190556 (C.D. Cal.
June 6, 2016); Pierson, supra note 247. Cook filed an additional lawsuit in federal court in
Los Angeles, asking that court to overturn the California state law on the grounds that
surrogacy contracts are unconstitutional. A federal judge dismissed Cook's lawsuit without
ruling on the merits, stating that Cook's claims should be decided by California's state
courts-which have so far ruled against her. Pierson, supra note 247.
250. Cook, 2016 WL 3190556, at *3.
251. See Greg Moran, Surrogate Mother Has Twin Girls, SAN DIEGO TRIB. (Nov.
22, 2001), http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/metro/20011122-999_7m22twins.
html.
252. Id.
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yers, suggesting a power imbalance. While experts say it is im-
possible to foresee all the difficulties and issues that may develop
in a surrogate parenting arrangement, many believe the legal
battle between Beasley and Wheeler/Berman could have been
prevented:
"If they knew in the beginning about the one-child arrangement and
selective reduction, why wasn't any of this documented in her writ-
ten agreement?" asked Zager [of the Organization of Parents
Through Surrogacy]. "Why did Ms. Beasley agree to sit on a table
and have multiple embryos planted in her? Why did she agree to
travel to the United States to be a surrogate, knowing she would not
get support from the British government, which is hostile to surroga-
cy anyway and what did she expect to get out of this? You have to
wonder whether she had the proper guidance and counseling before
.... ,,253
agreeing to this [situation].
Ideally, with proper guidance and counseling, the contract would
be written and reviewed by all parties to ensure consent is truly
voluntary.
Similarly, two potentially complicating factors in the Cook case
were that the intended father and the surrogate likely did not go
through a scrupulous agency, and the contract was simply poorly
worded. At forty-seven, Melissa Cook was quite a bit older than a
typical surrogate."4 Further, the surrogate and the intended fa-
ther never spoke before the contract was signed and the surrogate
was implanted, and the broker did not have a home study with
the intended father.
These facts might suggest that the contract should not be en-
forceable for reasons outside of a general public policy against
surrogacy or selective termination; indeed, contracts entered into
without the true voluntary consent and understanding of both
parties should not be enforced. It makes sense for traditional con-
tract principles to govern these cases of surrogacy-gone awry. In a
case where consent is legitimate and proper counseling is availa-
ble, the wishes of the contracting parties should be honored.
In another highly publicized case, Crystal Kelley, a woman who
had contracted to act as a gestational surrogate carrier for an in-
fertile couple, refused to terminate the pregnancy, as the intend-
253. Bryan Robinson, Fetuses and Surrogacy Lose in Legal Battle, ABC NEWS (Aug. 14,
2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92627&page=l.
254. O'Reilly, supra note 243.
255. Id.
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ed parents had requested . Under their surrogacy contract, the
surrogate agreed to selective fetus reduction and/or "abortion in
case of severe fetus abnormality. 2 7 The request to terminate
came after the parties learned that the fetus suffered from severe
birth defects that would leave the child with only a 25 percent
chance of having a "normal life., 258 The intended parents already
had three special-needs children and wanted to spare another
child from suffering."' Kelley, who described herself as "always"
against abortion, refused to terminate the pregnancy.6 0
The case was ultimately settled and Kelley retained custody of
the baby, but the validity of the contract was undermined when
Kelley chose to move and give birth to the baby in Michigan, a
state that does not recognize the validity of surrogacy contracts.
The child's medical problems turned out to be much more exten-
sive than initially thought.6 Unable to care for the child herself,
Kelley placed "Baby S" with an adoptive family, and the intended
father agreed to give up his parental rights as long as he and his
wife could keep in touch with the adoptive family about the baby's
health. 6
One might ask how Kelley, like Cook, came to sign a contract
in which she agreed to selective reduction if she was "always"
against abortion. Perhaps the issue here lies only with contract
law and consent, rather than with a global problem concerning
selective reduction clauses.
In each of these surrogacy-cases-gone-awry, failure to enforce
the contract would create results that were unintended by the
parties, resulting in the separation of twins or the birth of a child
with severe birth defects. In the case of Melissa Cook's triplets,
since reduction was not compelled, the question became who
should have custody of the children.6 The biological mother was
an anonymous egg donor and the biological father did not want
256. Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Campanile, supra note 241.
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the third child.26 Separating triplets by putting only one of the
children up for adoption seems unnecessarily cruel and a result
not advocated by anyone. And what if one or more of the children
were born with defects-would the surrogate bear some responsi-
bility?
Of course, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized that a
pregnant woman has the constitutional right to terminate the
pregnancy prior to the point of viability." Further, this right does
not extend to the natural father or spouse, who has no right to
force his wife to have an abortion, veto the decision, or even be
given notice of it.267 Thus, it follows that such a right belongs to
the woman who is carrying the baby, and not to the intended par-
ents, even if they are biologically related to the child. Further-
more, contract law should not have the power to take the consti-
tutional right to privacy away from a pregnant woman.68
Refusing to compel termination based on a contract clause in an
otherwise enforceable contract is not inconsistent with the gen-
eral principle that the gestational carrier is not the legal parent
of the child and that the contract should otherwise control the de-
termination of who is the parent. Rather it recognizes and re-
spects the fundamental right of all women, surrogate or other-
wise, to make decisions regarding their own bodies.
That said, while it seems rightly to be settled law that a court
cannot compel a pregnant woman to terminate a pregnancy
against her wishes, selective reduction or termination clauses can
still be enforced with a remedy other than specific performance.
Intended parents can still be permitted to sue the surrogate for
265. O'Reilly, supra note 243.
266. See 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," but
"[flor the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attend-
ing physician").
267. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897 (1992) (holding that
"the Constitution does not permit a State to require a married woman to obtain her hus-
band's consent before undergoing an abortion") (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danford, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)). The Casey Court reasoned that, "[t]he women most af-
fected by this law-those [victims of abuse] who most reasonably fear the consequences of
notifying their husbands that they are pregnant-are in the gravest danger." Id. (altera-
tion in original).
268. Furthermore, instances of compelled medical procedures in any case are rare. See
Naoki Kanaboshi, Competent Persons' Constitutional Right to Refuse Medical Treatment in
The U.S. and Japan: Application To Japanese Law, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 5, 30-32
(2006) (outlining courts' reasoning behind not compelling medical procedures).
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damages based on a decision to either continue or terminate the
pregnancy against the express wishes of the intended parents as
expressed in the contract.
Where a surrogate agrees, through contract, to terminate a
pregnancy under certain circumstances, one might argue that she
waived the constitutional right to privacy. In many instances, the
Supreme Court has held that constitutional rights can be
waived.269 For example, an individual can waive the right to trial
before a judge or jury, as long as the waiver is "done with suffi-
cient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences";... an individual can waive the right to remain silent or
the right to counsel provided "the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently";7 ' and an individual can waive the
right to be present at trial, as long as the absence is voluntary.
272
While specific performance generally is not,and should not be
available in a suit against a surrogate who waived her right to
privacy, no court has yet ruled on whether monetary damages are
available where the surrogate decides to continue with a preg-
nancy against the intended parents' wishes. A few state statutes,
however, have paved the way for a fair understanding of how to
deal with such contract clauses. New Hampshire's surrogacy
laws, for example, were amended in 2014 to provide some protec-
tion for surrogacy agreements.2 2 As amended, the statute pro-
vides that agreements that meet the minimum requirements set
forth in the statute, including a written provision outlining how
decisions regarding termination will be made, are presumptively
valid and enforceable.2 4 The statute also provides that parties are
entitled to "all remedies available at law or equity," unless they
agree otherwise, suggesting that a termination provision would
be enforceable under state law.27 5 Nevada's surrogacy law,
269. See generally Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (Vaivers of consti-
tutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."). See, e.g.,
infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
270. Brady, 397 U.S. at 742, 748.
271. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
272. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (holding that a defendant's right to
be present may be effectively waived by voluntary absence).
273. See S.B. 353, 2014 Sess. (N.H. 2014); see also Rich Vaughn, New Hampshire Pass-
es New, Improved Surrogacy Law, INT'L FERTILITY L. GRP. (July 25, 2014), https:/www.
iflg.net/new-hampshire-passes-new-improved-surrogacy-law/.
274. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:10-11 (2016).
275. Id. § 168-B:18. See generally Deborah L. Forman, Abortion Clauses in Surrogacy
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amended in 2013, though expressly precluding specific perfor-
mance as a remedy for a breach of a selective termination clause,
also provides that the parties are otherwise "entitled to any rem-
edy available at law or equity. 276 These statutes suggest the pos-
sibility of enforcing a selective reduction or termination clause,
though not necessarily through specific enforcement.
Ninety percent of parents in the United States exercise their
autonomy to abort a fetus found to have Downs Syndrome. " ' This
is a concern. Our society ought to promote conditions for flourish-
ing for people with Downs Syndrome so that parents may freely
choose to have a child with Downs Syndrome, and in making that
choice affirm the dignity of life.
Neither the private choice to select for healthy genes nor a lais-
sez-fair attitude to ART expresses an absence of the recognition of
the dignity of the disabled. In the first case, the intending parent
reasonably, rationally, and compassionately wants to have the
healthiest possible child. In the second case, the laissez-faire poli-
cy is intended to sustain the conditions for parents to have a say
in their own family planning. In neither case is the parent or the
policy expressing any attitude or perspective on identifiable per-
sons.
Accordingly, selective termination clauses should be enforced
in the same manner as other clauses in the contract. When the
parties agree to selective termination, the clause does not take
away the surrogate's right to choose-she makes the choice by
signing the contract. The clause grants the intended mother the
right to choose, respecting and honoring her reproductive free-
dom. Such agreements need not be treated differently from other
personal service contracts-in which parties often contract for
services that require significant sacrifice in exchange for financial
gain. Such contracts are routinely upheld in the name of individ-
ual autonomy and mutual gain.278
Contracts: Insights From a Case Study, 49 FAM. L.Q. 29 (2015) (discussing the unique is-
sues that arise from such termination revisions and different possible legal approaches to
surrogacy agreements).
276. NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.790 (2013).
277. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Gender/Class Divide: Reproduction, Privilege,
and the Workplace, 8 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 287, 310 (2013).
278. As Deborah Forman noted in her article about selective termination clauses:
[]e routinely enforce contracts governing other services that impose serious
physical risks or implicate privacy and bodily integrity. For example, if a
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The intended parents initiated the process that led to the con-
ception of the fetus, and they intended from the beginning to
raise the child. Thus, the intended parents should have the re-
sponsibility and freedom to make choices, embodied in their
agreement, regarding the child. Unless otherwise noted in the
contract, the surrogate never had intent to parent the child and
should not make such fundamental choices outside the scope of
the agreement. When parties undertake substantial financial and
emotional commitment in the effort to create a family, and their
terms are agreed to by the parties to a contract, their legitimate
expectations should be upheld.
Contract doctrine requires a commitment to be truly voluntary
before promises are enforceable. Therefore, the best way to regu-
late this area is to require that parties have sufficient infor-
mation and resources available before mutually assenting to the
contractual terms. Physicians and agencies must play a role in
expanding discussion of selective reduction or termination and
ensuring the intended parents and surrogate have discussed the
possibilities before proceeding.
II. THE LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE MARKET: WHY MARKET
FREEDOM AND CONTRACT LAW ARE THE BEST FORUMS FOR
ADDRESSING MOST ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM ART
Since agricultural advancements, reproduction has moved from
being primarily social to being primarily private in the factors of
its determination."' Today, the forces that reproduced class struc-
tures along racial lines are weakening as we move from status to
contract."' Family now, more than any time in human history, is
player for the NFL decided that he no longer wished to risk the potential for
long-term brain damage from participating in the sport, a court would not
compel him to play, but would award the team damages for his breach of con-
tract.
Forman, supra note 275, at 45.
279. See CHRISTOPHER RYAN & CACILDA JETHA, SEX AT DAWN: THE PREHISTORIC
ORIGINS OF MODERN SEXUALITY 10-15 (2010) (discussing the societal changes that oc-
curred when people began living in settled agricultural communities). "With agriculture,
virtually everything changed: the nature of status and power, social and family structures,
how humans interacted with the natural world, the gods they worshipped, the likelihood
and nature of warfare between groups, quality of life, longevity, and certainly, the rules
governing sexuality." Id. at 14.
280. See Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping
Family Formulations and Rights, 36 CARDOzO L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2015) (arguing that
non-traditional families should not be required to "wait for government approval to attain
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voluntary and private by virtue of consent and the range of possi-
ble familial structures.2 1
The family can be considered a private institution as opposed
to a public institution. In a private institution, the participants
are the stakeholders. With the exception of children under the
age of eighteen, participants are members voluntarily. In a public
institution, on the other hand, the participants are not stakehold-
ers, rather general members of the public and are ultimately in-
fluenced or affected by the institution involuntarily. Therefore,
because the family can be considered a private institution consist-
ing of voluntary members, the state has no authority or interest
in intervening absent serious identifiable harms to identifiable
282persons.
The paramount importance of autonomy in family planning is
especially clear in light of the vast emerging technologies availa-
ble in this area. The infinite bounds of technology are possibly be-
yond our comprehension. Certain technologies are difficult to
predict or anticipate, in essence mandating a lag or gap in the
law. 83
As discussed in prior parts of this article, this disconnect is es-
pecially notable in the area of reproductive technology, where, for
example, it is now possible to cryopreserve human embryos, 84
cloning is a real possibility, 285 it is possible for a woman born with
status equivalent to their married counterparts, or, in the case of intended parents who
are not biologically related to their intended children, their biological counterparts;
instead, such partners and intended parents should be able to secure their rights through
private contract").
281. See id. at 1027-34.
282. Some thoughtful people might say that it was a mistake to treat domestic violence
as a private matter rather than a matter of public concern. However, domestic violence
may be distinguished in two ways: (1) the prevalence of foresight and consent in the case
of reproductive autonomy and ART is missing in a domestic case; and (2) in the case of
domestic violence, there is a clear identifiable harm to an identifiable person.
283. Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright
Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1836 (2009).
284. See supra Part I.C.
285. Dana Dovey, The Science of Human Cloning: How Far We've Come and How Far
We're Capable of Going, MED. DAiLY (June 26, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.medicaldai
ly.com/science human-cloning-how-far-weve-come-and-how-far-were-capable-going-340006
(citing Cloning, NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/25020028/
(last visited Dec. 16, 2016)). It is generally accepted that reproductive human cloning is
theoretically possible; however, legal and ethical concerns make it probably that cloning
will remain limited to therapeutic research. See Rachael Rettner, Could Humans Be
Cloned?, LIVESCIENCE (May 16, 2013, 5:57 PM), http://www.livescience.com/32083-cloning-
people-biology.html. Current goals for therapeutic cloning (i.e., techniques that do not in-
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no reproductive organs to grow a womb and gave birth,"' and
uterus transplants are performed.287 Public law cannot anticipate
the bounds of science in the formation of family and is not
equipped to respond to the myriad questions that go along with
cultural shifts. But what is clear is that as technology continues
to evolve, a growing disconnect between law and technology is in-
evitable.
It is frequently said that the law lags behind technology,88 and
is widely understood as a result, that technology inevitably cre-
ates legal issues. It is virtually impossible for judicial case law to
keep up with the rapid pace of progress and technology in today's
world, and the legitimate expectations of society that develop
alongside. Notions of justice change subtly over time. As the law
evolves, struggling to respond to developing issues related to new
technology and to accommodate technological advances, 89 yet
newer technology takes hold, that technology calls into question
existing perspectives and paradigms in public and private life.
volve embryo transfer to a womb) include development of patient and disease specific
therapies for certain conditions, and replicating a patient's own cells for tissue replace-
ment. Dovey, supra note 285.
286. Patrick Sawyer, Woman Born With No Womb Gives Birth to Miracle Twins,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 31, 2015, 8:51 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/113
81463fWoman-born-with-no-womb-gives-birth-to-miracle-twins.html. The mother, Hayley
Haynes, discovered that she was genetically male at the age of nineteen, when she grew
concerned because she had never begun menstruating. Id. In 2007, a specialist found a
tiny womb that had been missed by earlier scans, and Hynes began a course of hormone
treatments to balance her levels of progesterone and estrogen and encourage uterine
growth. Id. By the time Hynes' womb was ready for IVF, her doctors estimated that she
had a 60 percent chance of becoming pregnant. Id.
287. Denise Grady, Hopeful Start for First Uterus Transplant Surgery in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/healthl/uterus-transplant-cleve
land-clinic.html.
288. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Agents of Change: How the Law 'Copes' with Tech-
nological Change, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 763, 764 (2011) [hereinafter Moses, Agents of
Change] (discussing the wide variety of terms used in law journals to "bemoano the law's
inability to keep pace with technological change"); Lesley Swanson, The Era of Cyber War-
fare: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Con-
flict, 32 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 305 (2010) (noting that "there is no provision
in international humanitarian law ... that explicitly outlaws cyber warfare or computer
network attacks ... [because] the law of war dates back to the nineteenth century and has
not yet been updated for applicability in the Information Age"); Ben Depoorter, Technology
and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1836
(2009) (noting that "[llegal delay is caused by the dynamic and unpredictable nature of
technological innovation"); Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race to
Keep Up With Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 239, 241 (2007)
[hereinafter Moses, Recurring Dilemmas] (noting that "technological change is often the
occasion for legal problems" and that "tension between law and technology ... is often re-
flected in metaphors involving competitors in a race with law the inevitable loser").
289. Moses, Agents of Change, supra note 288, at 765.
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Thus a growing law/technology disconnect is inevitable:
Although not every technology generates litigation and legal scholar-
ship, technological change is often occasion for legal problems. The
tension between law and technology has been observed by multiple
authors and is often reflected in metaphors involving competitions in
a race with law the inevitable loser. Those using these metaphors
are generally concerned about the law's failure-whether or not they
regard it as inevitable-to cope with technological change, especially
rapid or accelerating change. Scholars have used metaphors of the
law falling behind technology in contexts as diverse as railroads, in
vitro fertilization, computers, and the Internet.' 90
Unsurprisingly, rapid and unpredictable reproductive techno-
logical developments have posed significant legal challenges for
courts over the years.2"' The legal system has yet to establish con-
sistent guidelines that adequately protect the non-traditional
family forms that result from scientific advancements. For in-
stance, through the use of ART, a child can be born with five
adults who could possibly make a claim for parental status: a sur-
rogate (birth mother), a biological mother (ova donor), a biological
father (sperm donor), an intended mother, and an intended fa-
ther. Under the traditional definition of family, the only people
who would be completely excluded from the definition of "parent"
would be the two individuals who orchestrated the creation of the
child, since they have no biological or physical connection to the
child.292 However, under a more modern approach to family for-
mations, if all five parties consent, the resulting child could have
two primary parents (the intended parental parties) and three
other parental figures, who may play a cursory or involved role in
that child's life.
There are endless examples in which the existence and use of
ART, together with the outdated notion of the primacy of biology,
290. Moses, Recurring Dilemmas, supra note 288, at 241 (explaining why technological
change tends to generate legal problems and identifying four types of legal problems that
frequently follow technological change).
291. Id. at 239-41.
292. See, e.g., DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993) (holding that an "unrelated" per-
son may not retain custody unless a child's birth parents are unfit, and returning the two-
year-old child to birth parents); In the Matter of Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.
1992) (granting custody of three-year-old African American child to her biological grand-
parents, rather than to the white foster parents who had raised her from birth); see also
White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that former same-sex partner
lacked standing as an "interested party" under a Missouri Uniform Parentage Act provi-
sion that permitted any interested party to bring an action to determine the existence of a
mother-child relationship).
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have led courts to reach unintended results for both the biological
and intended parents. Take the well-publicized, controversial
case of In re Baby M, decided in the 1980s.293 In the case of this
typical surrogacy contract, the surrogate changed her mind after
giving birth and did not want to give the baby up to the intended
parents.294 The court refused to enforce the contract, and, contrary
to the contract terms, the surrogate ended up having visitation
rights with the baby.9 In similar cases, the surrogate has ended
up with full or joint custody. 6
Another case involved a surrogate who gave birth to twins.97
The intended parents, however, decided they did not want a boy
and, disregarding the requirements of their contract, picked up
only the female baby.9 In the end, the surrogate, who already
had three kids, kept the male twin and adopted him. 9 In another
case, Barbara and David hired a surrogate, Jamie, who donated
her egg and gave birth to a baby girl. °° Jamie then changed her
mind and refused to give up the baby to the intended parents, one
of whom was the biological father.0 ' The couple fulfilled every
part of their obligation, continuing to pay Jamie's medical bills,
293. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
294. Id. at 1236.
295. In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52, 55 (N.J. Super L. 1988).
296. See, e.g., Jo McFarlane & Polly Dunbar, Surrogate Mother Who Agreed to Give
Birth to a Baby For a Gay Couple She Met in Burger King Wins Custody of the Boy After
Judge Finds She Was 'Manipulated and Exploited', DAILY MAIL (July 2, 2016, 7:28 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3671887/Surrogate-mother-agreed-birth-baby-gay
-couple-met-Burger-King-wins-custody-boy-j udge-finds-manipulated-exploited.html (dis-
cussing a woman who was granted full custody of the baby she bore for a gay couple who
"manipulated and exploited" the woman); Vanessa Allen et al., 'I couldn't give my baby
away... they only wanted a toy'- Surrogate Mother Fought Legal Battle After Learning That
Would-Be Parents Were Violent, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 15, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.daily
mail.co.uk/news/article- 1356176/Surrogate-mother-wins-case-baby-giving-birth.html (dis-
cussing Miss N, who was granted full custody of the baby she bore for a couple after she
learned the husband was "controlling and violent"); Surrogate Mom Is Given Joint Custody
of Her Daughter, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 27, 1991, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/
article/185216/surrogate-mom-is-given-joint-custody-of-her-daughter.html?pgall (discuss-
ing when surrogate Elvira Jordan was granted partial custody of the baby she bore for a
couple who divorced).
297. Judy Mann, Nature Too Chancy for Contracts, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 1988), https:
f/www. washingtonpost.com/archive/local 1 988/04/22/nature-too-chancy-for-contracts/a46c
dd8e-39c6-4517-8be3-e9e9ce ldOOc3/.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Caitlin Keating, Heartbroken Parents Left Paying Child Support After Surrogate
Keeps Their Baby Girl, PEOPLE (Mar. 7, 2016, 1:25 PM), http://www.people.com/article/
heartbroken-parents-surrogate-keeps-child.
301. Id.
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even after she indicated she would not give up the baby."' Despite
spending $90,000 on legal fees, the couple was never able to get
custody of their intended child, but is still required to pay child
support.0 ' In yet another case, a sperm donor, who signed docu-
ments waiving his parental rights, was nonetheless ordered to
pay child support because a licensed physician was not involved
in the artificial insemination process, as required by Kansas
law. 4 Such unintended, and sometimes absurd, consequences
would not occur had the contracts been upheld.
As assisted reproductive technology becomes more and more
prevalent and as the technology continues to advance, such legal
issues will continue to grow. There is a change taking place in so-
ciety-contract is slowly replacing status. Because of rapid ad-
vances in reproductive technology, agreement, individual choice,
and autonomy are replacing biological relationship. Freedom of
contract has been pitted against public policy and is gaining
ground.0 Once family is viewed as a group of individuals who
"choose" to be relatives, the natural limits of state regulation and
the need for private agreement in the arena of emerging repro-
ductive technologies becomes evident.
While the contours of reproductive technology seem endless
and seem to create endless ethical questions, regulating such
technology creates its own set of ethical issues. Legislation gener-
ally reflects the social mores of the particular time and place. But
as the social mores change alongside changing technology, legis-
lation has not effectively kept up."' While the parts above high-
light the ways in which ART can be seen as threatening the puri-
ty of the mother and the family in general, on the flip side,
regulating the use of ART can raise other ethical concerns.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Chandrika Narayan, Kansas Court Says Sperm Donor Must Pay Child Support,
CNN (Jan. 24, 2014, 2:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/justice/kansas-sperm-do
nation/.
305. See, e.g., John Robertson, Surrogacy Contracts Gain Legal Ground, HASTINGS
BIOETHICS F. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/surrogacy-contracts-
gain-legal-ground! (stating that "even when legislatures have not addressed the issue,
courts are percipient enough to see the important role that contracts for gamete donation
and surrogacy play in contemporary reproduction and family formation").
306. Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change:
The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 505, 508 (2005).
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Because new technologies often serve more than one purpose,
laws enacted to regulate their use can create unnecessary and of-
ten unforeseen social controversies. For instance, in the years fol-
lowing the now-infamous birth of "Dolly the Sheep," the first suc-
cessful clone of an adult mammal, several states enacted broad
and vaguely defined bans against "human cloning. 3 7 One of the
key ethical issues with cloning is the moral status of the cloned
embryo, which is created solely for destruction."' Cloning tech-
nology has been viewed as interfering with nature with no ethical
backing. 9 However, scientists now highlight "therapeutic rea-
sons" for cloning, "to make new organs to replace sick or damaged
ones, and thus to save life rather than to make new and replicat-
ed human beings.""31 By lumping all uses of a technology together,
such bans can "interfere with or impose special burdens" by set-
ting "limitations on stem cell research, therapies, and cures" for
diseases like Parkinson's and Alzheimers, and for certain spinal
cord injuries.311
Technology will continue to plow forward regardless of regula-
tion. People generally fear what is not known or understood, and
change can be scary, but resistance to change cannot persist. Re-
productive technology has great potential to improve reproductive
health and the quality of life, and provides innovation and effi-
ciencies whose value cannot be overstated. Regulation, on the
other hand, can inhibit progress. The law must be nimble to keep
pace with the progress of technology, the legitimate expectations
of society, and changing notions of justice. Specifically, the law
should continually examine and question forever changing tradi-
307. Julie Rovner, Cloning, Stem Cells Long Mired in Legislative Gridlock, NPR (May
16, 2013, 3:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/05/16/184261714/clon
ing-stem-cells-long-mired-in-legislative-gridlock.
308. Id.
309. TORE YTTERLAND SILSET & MERETE LIE, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2007).
310. Id.
311. Missourians Against Human Cloning v. Carnahan, 190 S.W.3d 451, 452, 455, 460-
61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). The case involved a pro-life advocacy group's challenge to the certi-
fied ballot title for the 'Missouri Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative" as "insufficient
or unfair." -d. at 452. Plaintiffs argued that the purpose of stem cell research is irrelevant
where it involves the creation of a human embryo, even "at the one-celled stage of human
development," because such "virtually identical" genetic products constitute clones. Id. at
455. Another case, Feminists Choosing Life of N.Y, Inc. v. Empire State Stem Cell Bd.,
involved a pro-life feminist group's challenge to the use of state funding "directly or indi-
rectly utilized" for "human reproductive cloning." 87 A.D.3d 47, 51 (2011); see also David
M. Panchision, Repairing the Nervous System with Stem Cells, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH,
https:/Hstemcells.nih.gov/info/Regenerative-Medicine/2006Chapter3.htm.
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tional gender roles and family formations. Political theorists and
leaders from Montesquieu to Jefferson have asserted the need for
the law, as society's "codified ethics," '312 to "keep pace with the
times" '313 and adapt "in such a manner to the people for whom
they are framed." '314 Laws are most effective when adhered to by
the majority of a community, where members hold each other ac-
countable for breaking legal and social norms. As laws conflict
with prevailing social values, they become less effective," be-
cause community members find less moral incentive for holding
themselves and each other accountable to them. This can some-
times lead to law-breaking.1 But the law's failure to develop in
tandem with social norms can also lead to new, creative readings
of existing laws whose interpretations rely, in part, on social
standards.
The most effective and efficient way for the law to keep pace
with assisted reproductive technologies is through contract. Be-
cause family and intimate relationships are already highly
unique and individual, and made more so through the endless
possibilities of ART, they often do not fit within the limitations of
government regulations, and may be more functionally structured
through contracts. Families that do not fit the traditional mold
should not have to wait for government approval to attain status
equivalent to their married or biological counterparts. Instead,
such partners and intended parents should be able to secure their
rights through private contract.
Contracts between and among family members, and between
family members and clinics should be enforced in the same ways
that commercial contracts are enforced. People should be their
own lawmakers when it comes to reproduction and their personal
relationships. Recognition of family arrangements through con-
tract is consistent with cultural and legal momentum, as technol-
ogy continues to develop and the significance of biology continues
to decrease.
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CONCLUSION
There is a deep societal hesitance to allow technological possi-
bilities and the market to facilitate the creation of non-traditional
families. The reality, however, is that both technology generally,
and reproductive technology specifically, are already intricately
tied to the market. Very rarely do we see inquiry for inquiry's sa-
ke; more often we see inquiry based on utility and demand. Mar-
ket demand and technological advances often develop in tandem
and remain on the same trajectory. In most cases, the market is a
necessary catalyst for technological change-commercialization is
what propels technological advancements forward.
It is impossible and unwise to hold back the momentum of the
market. As the market demand for alternate means of having
children grows, alternative reproductive technologies grow along
side. By necessity, the law must respond. As illustrated, the law
too often lags behind technology, leaving unanswered ethical and
legal dilemmas. A salient feature of private contracts is the abil-
ity to address the ever-growing individual and unique needs of
parties based on the endless arrangements made possible by
technology.
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